


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OBSERVATIONS
UPON THE
WARRE
OF
HUNGARY.



L O N D O N,

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T H E

PREFACE.

T*Hese Observations were written, soon after the Things were done : that is, toward the latter end of that Winter, which followed the Taking of Newhausel. And they have now lost much of their Relish : in regard the Actions are less fresh in memory, and the Ideas of later Events and Accidents have taken possession of Mens Minds. But the delay could not be avoided. For in the late Reign they would by no means be suffer'd to be Printed. though they had been severely Garbled by some Friends ; and though they were submitted to any further Expurgations ; and lastly though nothing could be Objected, against the truth of the Matters here deliver'd. However there were several Written Copies went abroad. Some whereof were perused by the most Eminent in the late Court, and particularly by the French Embassadour. Who freely declared, that he agreed with the Author in every point. But you*

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may imagine, those passages were then struck out, which seemed to touch too hard upon his Master the French King ; or that Kings Masters, the Jesuites.

Perhaps it may seem presumptuous, to give any Judgment of the Actions of great Men. But the thing well consider'd, it is no more then what every body does. Every body does that in Discourse, which is here done in Writing: that is, He says what he thinks, of such Occurrences as he reads or hears of. They that have the Glory to appear publickly in the Eyes of Mankind, do at the same time come under their Judgment. and as in the common Stages, so in the Grand Theater of the World, the most principal and greatest Actors must undergo the Censure, even of the meanest and most unskilful Spectators.

You will say ; We cannot give a Judgment of those Actions, of which we do not know the reason. But if this hold good, none can judge of Actions, save only They that designed them: for They only have a full knowledge of the Reasons. And at this rate, the Lookers on may not dislike the play of the most bungling Gamester. Also it would hence follow, that all Actions must be esteemed alike, and we must give an implicit approbation

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bation of every thing that's done. So that our Expedition to the Isle of Rê, which (as some think) had as many Errors as Actions, must be thought a piece of as good Conduct, as the Conquest of Egypt by Sultan Selim.

But we do well know that very famous Commanders are noted and confest to have had their Mistakes. I forbear to enlarge upon this Subject (which it were easie to do) and shall instance only in Pompey: who was one of the greatest Captains that the World hath known. Cæsar observes, that he acted unskilfully in the Battel of Pharsalia, when he order'd his Men to stand their ground, and receive their Enemies Charge. whereas plainly it adds Courage to the Soldier, to be in motion and advancing upon the Enemy. But Tully (who pretended to judge of few things which he did not well understand) condemns Pompey for fighting at all. Signa tirone & collectitio Exercitu cum Legionibus robustissimis contulit. And he tells us what led him into that Error. Quadam ex Pugnâ (that of Dyrrhachium he means) coepit suis militibus confidere. And then he adds; Ex eo tempore Vir ille summus, nullus Imperator fuit. There was yet a greater Error, though no notice be taken of it, which
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Pompey committed in this *Affair*. And that was ; That he staid at all in Greece, after that Cæsar and his Army were got thither. There he staid, as if he had been tied by some Charmes, to be bearded, and besieged, and at last beaten ; when, being Master at Sea, and his whole Naval Force being come to him, he might with the greatest ease have crost over into Italy, and have shut Cæsar out of it. And nothing could then hinder his Marching to Rome : where he might have had his full Revenge upon the adverse Faction. Which was the thing he long'd after. For the same Tully writes of him ; *Animus ejus Sullaturit & Proscripturit jam diu*. He that would know the Intrigues of those Affairs, must read Tully.

We must beg pardon of the Illustrious Heroe of Lorrain, if his Conduct sometimes hath not been understood. But this may be said in his Vindication once for all ; that there is great reason to believe, that he was too often bound up by strict Orders. The giving of which sort of Orders is a thing that hath been always condemn'd, and will be always practis'd. It is a fine thing to sit contriving in a Cabinet, and cutting out work for those that must undergo the labour and the danger. But if Princes will have their work well done, (with
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the lowest Submission be it spoken); they should either go themselves, or trust those they send. If ever any Council were qualified to manage Wars by particular Orders, it was the Roman Senate: which was composed, for the most part, of Persons that had been in high Command. it was in effect a Council or Assembly of Generals. Yet they never took upon them to prescribe to, or direct, the Persons they employed; but left them to their full liberty, to act according to their own Judgment and Discretion.

The Author cannot promise a Continuation of the Work here begun. He hath made some farther Remarks upon things that have happen'd in the progress of this War. and he hath imprint-ed them in his Mind. But it is uncertain, whether he will have the leisure to digest them, and to make them fit for publick View. If he do proceed, Prince Lewis of Baden (for any thing yet appears) will be the prime Favourite of those Observations.

OBSER-

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE War of Hungary.

CHAP. I. TECKELY.

WHile his Imperial Majesty is engaged in a War with France, by the Instigation of the Jesuits (as it is constantly affirmed), who therein served the French Interest, great Severities are used against his Protestant Subjects of Hungary. who till then, and for a long time, had enjoyed the liberty of their Religion, establish'd by Law. but both their Religious, and likewise their Civil Liberties, (as themselves complain) were now invaded and subverted. After extreme Sufferings, and to avoid a total Destruction, the Hungarians take Arms, Count Teckely being their Head: and maintain a War with various Fortune. The Emperour concludes a Peace with the French King: and his Forces (now grown stronger in Hungary) having some Successes, impale their Prisoners. The others in Revenge impale theirs. and both sides grow weary of Impaling. But the Hungarians, being press'd very hard, fly to the Turk for Succour. The Grand Signior takes them into his Protection: and in their Quarrel, sends a mighty Army against the Emperour, under his Grand Visier Kara Mustapha. Which the Emperour opposes with all the Force he can make, commanded by the High-born Prince, Charles Duke of Lorraine.

Observations.

I shall not here meddle with the Justice of the Emperour's or the Hungarians Cause. Since it depends much upon the Constitution of that Kingdom, which I do not pretend to know. That may be just and lawful in Hungary or Poland, which would be very unlawful

lawful in *England* or *France*. But surely it is much doubted, whether his Imperial Majesty did well in point of Prudence, to suffer his Subjects to be thus provoked, in such Circumstances of Time and Place. It was in a Time, when he had an Enemy upon his Arm, that was ready to swallow up all *Europe*: and it was in a Place bordering upon the *Turks*, who are both willing to take, and able to use such Advantages.

2. If the *French* did secretly incite the Emperour to Severities, and his Subjects to Resistance, it is no great wonder. For they had then a dangerous War with Him and his Confederates: and it is thought no Crime to use all ways and means, to weaken and distract an Enemy. But the wonder is, that the Jesuits would be the Instruments of so great Mischief to his Imperial Majesty, who had so great a Favour for their Order. However this may seem less strange, if we consider that the Jesuits are wise: and regard their Interest, more than their Inclinations or Obligations. They know that in great Affairs, Gratitude and good Nature look like foolish things. And therefore they might think fit to forsake, or even to betray, a Prince that loved them; thereby to gratify a Prince that was useful to them. The truth is, they wanted the Power of *France*, to defend and support them against their great Enemy the Pope. who 'tis thought had much rather see the Jesuits rooted out of Christendom, than the Protestants out of *Hungary*. So that as things stood, we must not blame the Fathers, if they could deny nothing to the *French* King.

3. By the Impaling the Prisoners, and the Success of it, we may observe; that extraordinary Severities are not to be used to Prisoners of War, where the Enemy is in a Condition to retaliate. Upon the first Revolt of the *Hollanders*, the Duke of *Alva* caused all those that he took in fight, to be executed by the hands of the Hangman. But when he saw that the *Dutch* caused all whom they took, to be executed likewise without mercy; his dire Soul was forced to submit to the necessity of fair War. as *Grotius* informs us, in his most excellent *Belgick* History.

4. Count *Teckele* is severely censur'd for calling in the *Turk* to his Assistance. And surely if the Emperour's proceedings were just and good, and *Teckele*'s Arms unlawful; his joyning with the *Infidels* was a great aggravation of his Crime. Nor doth the Necessity he was reduced to, in any measure excuse him: since it was a Necessity of his own making. As he that hath robb'd a Man, may find a Necessity to kill him too, to prevent pursuit or discovery. Or as *Catiline* says in the Play;

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*The Ills that I have done cannot be safe,
But by attempting greater.*

On the other side, if the Imperial Ministers did unjustly persecute and oppress; the Necessity was then of their making, and the Consequences of it ly at their Doors. For where a Necessity brings Mischief, the Authors of the Necessity are the Authors of the Mischief. And to think it unlawful to joyn with Infidels against Christians in any case whatsoever, is a very great Mistake. For if Merchants be set upon by Christian Pirates, and a Squadron of *Algerines* come by; who can condemn the Merchants, if they joyn with those worst of Infidels to preserve themselves, and to destroy the Christians that would destroy them? Upon which account the *English*, at our first trading into the *East-Indies*, did several times joyn with *Mahometans* and *Pagans* against the *Portugals*.

5. The Grand Visier and the Duke of Lorrain are now enter'd the Lists. And surely it is a noble Sight, when two great Champions are engaged against each other. They draw the Eyes of the whole World upon them, and are the Subject of all Mens Discourses. Many such Pairs have their Names recorded in the Books of Fame. But those are most remarkable, who have had a Tug of some Continuance: whereby they might shew their Play, and give the utmost Efforts of their Skill and Courage. Such were *Hannibal* and *Marcellus*, the two elder *Scipio's* and the two *Rasdrubals*, *Mithridates* and *Lucullus*, *Pompey* and *Sertorius*, *Cesar* and *Vercingetorix*, *Cesar* and *Pompey*. And after them, *Germanicus* and *Arminius*, *Cerealis* and *Civilis*, *Trajan* and *Decabalus*. *Charlemain* and *Wittikind*, who fought twelve Battels, may justly claim a room among these famous Combatants. So may *Francis* the First and *Charles* the Fifth: who had almost continual Wars, and were brave Captains as well as mighty Princes. To whom may be added, the Great *Gonsalvo* and *Monfieur Lautrec*, stiff adversaries in the Wars of *Naples*: and in the Wars of *Piemont*, *Dom Ferdinand Gonsaga* and the Marshal of *Brissac*. Then follow, *Henry* the Fourth and the Duke of *Parma*, *Maurice* Prince of *Orange* and *Spinola*, *Gustavus Adolphus* and Count *Tilly*, the same *Gustavus* and *Walstein*, *Turenne* and *Montecuculi*. Others I omit, and hasten back to the *Hungarian War*.

CHAP. II. VIENNA.

THE Duke of Lorrain being first in the Field, sits down before Newhausel: but upon the Enemies Advance he raises the Siege.

Observations upon the

And finding himself much over-power'd, he encamps near Raab: upon a River of that name, which there falls into the Danube. The Grand Visier comes on: and while his Main Body confronts the Duke, the Tartars tracing the River towards the head, soon find or make their way over. For which great blame is laid upon the Hungarians, who had the Guard of the passages committed to them. But the Duke hereupon draws off to Raab Town, where he divides his Army. Himself and the Cavalry make their Retreat directly to Vienna: being shrewdly ruffled by the Tartars, who fell upon them in their March unawares. The Foot are ordered to pass the Danube, and to march to the same Place. there being Men first drawn out of them, to make up very strong Garrisons for Raab, Comorra, and Leopoldstat. Upon the Duke's arrival at Vienna (from whence the Emperour and his whole Court were now retired) he marches over the Bridge into an Island of the Danube called St. Leopold, that lies over against the City. This Post he maintains a while: but afterwards deserts it, for Reasons not known, and marches clear away. Moreover his Foot arrive also in good time, and before the Grand Visier could come up with the Main of his Army. Who laid all things aside, and overlook'd all Difficulties, to attacke this Imperial City. The Siege is carried on for two Months with all vigour and violence, and with very great loss of Men. Count Staremberg commanded within the Place, and did well defend it. But however it was brought at last to great Extremities. Then come the Christian Forces, commanded by the King of Poland, the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria, the Duke of Lorraine and Prince Waldeck: who rout the Turkish Army, and relieve the City. And now Count Teckely desires to submit upon fair terms: but no terms would be given him. whereupon he renews his Alliance with the Turks. The Duke of Saxony marcheth home with his Troops. The rest of the Christian Army advance into Hungary; and take Gran, Lewents, and other places. The Grand Visier, having rallied he remains of his broken Army, and strangled several Bassa's and other Officers for not doing their Duties; is afterward strangled himself, to appease the Rage of the Soldiers and People.

Observations.

IT must be confess'd, that in this beginning of the Campagne, the Duke of Lorraine had a hard Game to play. as all have that must act upon the defensive, against a much over-matching Enemy. But the Duke seems to have dangerously mistaken his measures, in choosing a Post which he was not able to maintain. which brought all things to the utmost hazard. How could he expect that the Tartars (of whom the

the Grand *Vijer* had thirty thousand) should be stop'd by a small short River; that make it their practice to swim over the *Nieper*, the *Niester*, and the *Danube*? Nor let the *Hungarians* be blamed for not defending the *Passes*. for it doth not appear how it was possible to be done. Had the Duke strongly encamp'd under the Walls of *Raab*, and not at that distance he did, which was seven or eight Miles; as he had covered the Country in effect as well, so he had secured his Army much better. And perhaps he had done best, to have posted himself yet more backward. What though some Frontier places had been thereby exposed? It had been more advisable to sacrifice a part, than so greatly to endanger the whole. And this seems to have been the Sentiment of the Marshal of *Crequi*, when he managed a defensive War against this Duke, in his own Country of *Lorrain*. He posted himself at once upon the *Moselle*: leaving the *Saar* (as good a Stream as the *Raab*) and all the Places upon it, with the whole Country between those two Rivers, open to the invading Army. Which he thought a less Evil, than to grasp what he could not hold; and thereby put his own Army (upon which the Fortune of *France* depended) in danger of a hasty and disgraceful Retreat, or perhaps a total Ruine.

2. In the Duke's retreat to *Vienna* some People are unsatisfi'd with two things. The One is, that as his Troops were marching, the *Tartars* were upon them and among them, before they were in the least aware of it. Which they think could not be, if the Duke had not strangely wanted Intelligence in the Emperour's own Country; and if he had taken care to send out his Scouts in due manner, and throughly to discover the ways by which he was to march, as cautious and skilful Generals use to do. The other thing is, that when these Troops were got to *Vienna*, they never turn'd their faces toward the Enemy: but lay in that Island of *St. Leopold*, as it were without Life and Soul. I confess they might well be daunted with the disgraces and dangers of their Retreat, and the dismal condition of Affairs. But then they should have been made to recover their Spirits by some successful Encounters: of which there were fair Opportunities by the posture the *Turks* were in. Who came up in scrambling Parties, their main Body not arriving till several days after.

3. If the Duke of *Lorrain* had now a hard Game, sure the Grand *Vijer* had an easy one. He commanded a mighty Force, which had nothing to withstand or oppose it: the *Christian* Army being broken up, and as it were quite vanish'd. So that he was now (if I may use an odd

Expressi-

Expression) like a Lord in a Hutch ; he might turn himself which way he pleased. There was only one Caution to be used ; That whereas the Christians had mainly provided for the defence of four Towns, let what will become of the rest ; he would for the present forbear meddling with those Towns. But every where else he might go on conquering and to conquer: no other place being capable to make resistance. A few Examples of barbarous Cruelty toward those that stood it out (to which the Grand *Visier's* nature would easily have inclin'd him), and of good usage to those that readily yielded, would in that terror have open'd him the Gates of all those Places. And in humane probability, he might that Summer have subdu'd all the *Austrian* Dominions on the South side the *Danube*, the Towns of *Raab* and *Vienna* excepted. Or if he would be content with destroying the open Country, he might have done it so thoroughly in two or three Months time, as not to leave a House standing, nor hardly a Man or Beast living. And in the like space of time he might have serv'd *Bohemia* so too, and other parts of *Germany*. It would have been such a Destruction, as never was since the time of *Attila*. But the *Visier's* pride and folly and evil Genius, made him leave these advantages and these certainties ; to fall upon a strong and populous City, that had a Army in Garrison, that was a hundred Miles within the Enemies Country, and upon a great River which he was not sure nor likely to command on both sides. Nothing could break his Army, nor deliver those Countries out of his hands, but such a Siege.

4. As it was a grand Error, in the *Visier* to undertake this Siege, so he committed divers others in the Prosecution of it. In the first place he destroy'd all the Country near him with Sword and Fire: by which means great quantities of Provisions were destroy'd, that should have been preserved for the sustenance of his Army. for want of which, he was fain to supply himself by Convoys from *Hungary*. Also when the *Christians* advanced to relieve *Vienna*, he caused his Men to leave the advantage of their Camp, in which they were strongly fortified, and to meet their Enemies in the open Field. When as the *Christians* could not stay by it : having no Provisions, wherewith the *Turks* abounded. Moreover when his Army went out to fight, he went not out with them ; but shamefully stay'd behind, and kept at a distance. And when they were routed, and fled, he fled with the foremost, as fast as his Horse could carry him. without any offer to rally, or any endeavour to make a Retreat. His strangling some of the run-away *Bassa's* afterward, did no way purge his own baseness. take them at the worst, they did but follow his Example. He therefore seems to have well deserved his ignominious

minious End : going off the stage inglorious and with the Character of a proud and cruel Coward.

5. I believe most men conclude, that the Emperour did very prudently, in retiring from *Vienna* upon the Enemies Advance : thereby securing his own Sacred Person. And I confess the safety of the Prince is a matter of highest Importance. But yet sometimes wise Princes do lay aside the thoughts of securing their own Persons, when all lies at stake. for in such cases, the place of greatest danger is the place where the Prince should be. The Emperour *Otho* did absolutely ruine his Affairs by securing his Person : and by avoiding present danger, did fall into a total and final Destruction. If the King of *Denmark* had retir'd from *Copenhagen*, when it was set upon by the *Swede* ; he might have secur'd his Person, but he had lost both his City and his Kingdoms. whereas by his Presence, and personal Gallantry, he preserved all. And surely it cannot be deny'd, but that this withdrawing of the Emperour did much weaken *Vienna* : from whence above three score thousand People are said to have retired or fled upon that occasion. If it be said, that most of these were an unwarlike Multitude, I will admit they were. But had the Emperour staid, every Man (and almost every Woman) would have been a Soldier in the presence of his Imperial Majesty. Moreover it had then been easy to defend the Island of *St. Leopold* : whereby the passage over the *Danube* had been kept open, and a Communication with all the Countries behind it. Which had made the Emperours stay at *Vienna* to be much more safe, and likewise much more honourable ; than if he had been laid up in a place, which the Enemy might have begit on all sides.

6. Some think that the Duke of *Lorraine*, notwithstanding the withdrawing of the Emperour, and of those that went out with him and after him, might well enough have defended the Island of *St. Leopold*. This Island lies close to *Vienna* : being made by the *Danube*, and about four *English* miles in length. There is a Bridge into it from the City : and from it you pass on, over two other small Islands and three other Bridges, to the most Northern bank of the River : the City standing upon the most Southern. In the Island first mention'd the Duke placed himself, as hath been related. But he departed thence when the Grand *Vizier* came up with his whole Army ; which was seven or eight days after. Concerning which departure I shall set down the words of *John Peter a Valcaren*, Judge Advocate of the Imperial Army : who hath given us a particular account of this Siege. and I think it is the best we have. The Duke of *Lorraine*, saith he, who hitherto remained with the
Cavalry

Cavalry in the Island of St. Leopold, and as we thought did not intend to stir from thence, altering his resolution, marched over the Bridges that lead towards Moravia with these Regiments, &c. And afterward he adds; As for those that were besieged, they wished nothing more, than that the Duke would have staid in the Island of St. Leopold: which would have preserved a free Communication and Entercourse, as well with the Emperour, as with the territories of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and other parts of the Empire, from whence we might have receiv'd Supplies of every thing we needed. This was the opinion of the besieged, who afterward felt those hardships, that were brought upon them by the quitting of that place. But however we are not to doubt of the sufficiency of the Reasons, that moved the Duke of Lorrain to hasten his departure thence.

If the Author knew those sufficient Reasons, he did not well to conceal them. for it highly concern'd the Duke's honour, that Satisfaction should be given to all men in this matter: whereas now, many remain unsatisfied. For the Duke of Lorrain had his whole Cavalry with him, which could not be less then eight or nine thousand. And there was come to him the Prince *Lubomirski* with 4000 *Polish* Horse, and General *Schultz* with 3000 *Germans*. He had also a great River between him and the Enemy. for though the *Danube* do there divide it self into four Branches, yet every Branch is a large and deep Stream. And of this he had but four *English* Miles to guard: two above the City, and two below it. Then as to Forrage, 'tis hard to believe but that all the one side of the *Danube* might maintain fifteen or sixteen thousand Horse, as well as fifty or sixty thousand were maintain'd by the other.

7. Though the Islands of the *Danube* were thus unhappily quitted, yet still (the *Christians* commanding the River, as having all the Vessels both above and below the City); the best and easiest way to relieve it, seems to have been by those Islands. Had *Maurice* Prince of *Orange* been now alive, and directed these Affairs, (who as he had all the Arts of War, so particularly he seem'd in his Element when he was amongst great Waters; and both exquisitely knew, and could most dexterously use, all the advantages of commanding them): he would very probably have gone this way, and have done his business without much hazard. The *Turks* had no Camp on this side, so fortifi'd as that on the other side was. Nor would their vast numbers (particularly of Horse) have stood them in much stead amongst these small Islands. And though they might possibly have defended these their Quarters, yet so great a Force must be upon this Duty, that the Siege must in the mean

mean time have stood still, or at least could not be carried on with requisite Vigour. Moreover the *Christians* might have attempted a Relief this way, much sooner than the other. for which they were so long preparing, that the City was in great danger to be lost in the mean time. But the *Christian* Army went the plain way to work: that is, they cross'd the River, and marched in fair Order along the Southern bank of it, openly and directly upon the *Ottoman* Camp. And their glorious Success seems to have justified their Counsels. But yet we must bear in mind; that they had certainly miscarried, if their Enemies had not been quite mad; and by a prodigious Error quitted the advantage of their Ground.

8. The *Christian* Army had such Illustrious Commanders, and so many great Princes were there engaged in person, that few Armies in the World can shew the like. The King and the two *Electors* commanded their own Forces, *Lorrain* commanded the Forces of the Emperour, and *Waldeck* the Forces of the Empire. And they all did their work substantially and bravely. It must likewise be granted, that the *Turks* on their part left nothing undone for the gaining of their prize; and that they strain'd themselves to the utmost, to take the City before the Relief came up, continuing also to press very hard upon it, even while their Army was routing, and their Camp forcing. Nevertheless if their whole Carriage of the Affair be well consider'd, we may observe in them more Industry and Pertinacy, than either Skill or Valour.

9. By the raising of *Vienna's* Siege, and the destruction of the *Ottoman* Army, the Scene of Affairs was quite alter'd. and the Emperour's Condition was now as high, as it had been low before. He could now think of nothing less, than of beating the *Turk* out of *Hungary*, and afterward out of *Europe*. which later is the easier of the two. To accomplish which glorious and dazling Enterprize, it much concern'd him to make up with his own revolted Subjects, upon any reasonable terms. Which the King of *Poland*, and likewise the Pope himself (as it is confidently affirm'd) did advise and exhort him to. The Pope (whom all his actions declare to be a wise man) might well consider, That the giving ease to a few underling Protestants for a time, was an Inconvenience of no value: when it would bring with it such vast advantages another way, and so great an enlargement both of the Emperour's Temporal, and his own Ecclesiastical Dominion. Moreover the *Hungarians* were now very inclinable and desirous to make their peace. in order whereunto, they made humble and repeated Applications to his Imperial

Majesty. But no Treaty with them would be hearken'd to: and they were given to understand, that they must submit without Conditions. 'Tis true, they had afterwards a Pardon granted them: with a promise to preserve their Civil and Religious Liberties. But the Terror of *Vienna* was then over: and they had renewed and strengthened their Confederacy with the *Turks*: and they were then more hardened against the Emperour. So that Count *Teckely* and most of the chief Men, and all the strong Places, still refus'd to come in.

The want of a Peace on this side was an infinite prejudice to the Emperour's Affairs. For the *Hungarians*, who might have greatly increased his Force, did now much divide and distract it. The King of *Poland* was not able to make good his Quarters in Upper *Hungary*, where the Revolters had so many Garrisons. And the *Germans*, who staid it out, were put upon hard Duty. Also the same disadvantage continued in the two following Campaigns: a great Force being employ'd all along against the *Hungarians*. They are at last in a manner totally reduced. But this Work might have been much more difficult, if *Teckely's* Imprisonment had not made it easy. And now the Castle of *Mongatz*, which is the only place remaining, doth still make a considerable diversion, and occasions no small hardships. Another ill Effect was, that soon after the Emperour's return to *Vienna*, the Duke of *Saxony* went away home with his Troops, being ten thousand good Men. Which it is believed he did, because the Resolutions against the *Hungarians* were so severe and inflexible, and because his Intercession for them was rejected.

7. Count *Staremborg* hath made himself famous to the Worlds end by his gallant defence of *Vienna*. and he is worthily honour'd for it. But he suffers a little diminution, in the opinion of some Men, by a Letter he wrote to the Duke of *Lorrain* during the Siege. which was also printed and made publick. Herein they are scandalized at it, because it is so abominably Complemental. And truly I could wish, that this Letter had not been written. Flattering and fawning doth no way become a Man of Honour; and it also blemishes those to whom it is directed, as if they delighted in it.

C H A P. III. B U D A. 1684.

THE Grand Signior makes Kara Ibrahim Bassa, his Chief Visier; and Cheitan Ibrahim Bassa, his Sersquier or General for the War of Hungary. They get together a sorry Army; most of them being new Men, and

and as much without Courage as Discipline. The Duke of Lorrain takes the Field about the same time. His first Action is the taking of Vicegrad: which is a Castle upon the Danube, between Gran and Buda. Then he marches back to Gran; and passing the Danube, he advances toward the Enemy on that side. Part of the Turks Army engage the Imperialists, and are beaten. Whereupon the Duke possesses himself of Vacia, abandon'd by the Turks; and he batters and takes Pest, which lies over against Buda. Then he repasses the Danube upon a Bridge of Boats. The Serasquier retires, leaving in Buda fifteen thousand Men: which place the Duke besieges. And being incommoded by the Serasquier, who lay at some distance; he marches against him with his Horse and Dragoons, (which were about twelve thousand), beats him, and routs his whole Army. Then he returns to the Siege, and falls close to battering and storming. By which, and by the Sallies of that rampant Garrison, he soon lost the greatest part of his Infantry. So that now the Siege was at a stand. In the mean while a Peace is concluded in Flanders: chiefly by the Mediation and Labour of the States of Holland. By which means the Germans (whom the Flemish Affairs did much concern, and who therefore kept a good Force upon the Rhine) were set free to march into Hungary. This they immediately do: and particularly the Duke of Bavaria, with a good Army of his own. After these great Reinforcements, the Attacques at Buda are push'd on with all vigour. and on the other side the Turks makes an obstinate defence. The Serasquier mean while rallies and increases his Army. But not trusting to them, he keeps at a distance. However he hinders the Christians, all he can, from having Forage and Provisions. By the want of which, and by the approaching Winter, and by other hardships and difficulties, they are enforced at last to raise the Siege. They draw off without disturbance: their Army being in very ill condition. and being got over the Danube; they abandon Pest, leave a small Garrison in Vacia, and retire to their Winter Quarters. Nor was it long, before Vacia was taken by a party of Turks out of Buda. During these Transactions, General Schultz (in Upper Hungary) takes Count Teckely to task, who holds him hard to it. At last Teckely is surprized: and loses his Baggage, with a good part of his Army. But yet afterward he makes good his Garrisons, and stands his ground.

Observations.

I. **U**PON the first Defeat of the Serasquier, and the taking of Pest and Vacia, the Duke of Lorrain was in the same high Condition, that the Grand Visier was the year before. For there was now no Army that durst look him in the face. And the Turks were shut out of Upper

Hungary; having lost their only Pass upon the *Danube*, by losing *Pest*. Also the Duke's advantage was yet greater, when he had been suffer'd to lay his Bridge over the River. for now he might act on which side he pleased. He might March after the *Serasquier*: and either drive him over the Bridge of *Esseck* (and so out of the Country) without fighting; or certainly beat him, if he had fought. They that were so easily routed by his Cavalry, would have stood much less against his whole Army. Then for the Garrisons; if he could but let *Buda* alone, there was scarce any other that was like to make any considerable resistance. And Count *Lesly* being then in those Parts, with a good Army, and prosperous; the Duke and he joyning, must have born down all before them. Also if the Duke had kept on the other side of the *Danube*, he had found things there as easy. only *Newhausel* was to be avoided at present: there being then in it an intractable Garrison of ten thousand Men. And perhaps *Agria* and *Waradine* might have held out a week or two. But for the other Places, they had been nothing in his hands. The easy taking of *Zolnock* and *Saravas* afterward (which are two of the best of them), doth plainly make it appear, how weak a defence they were like to make. So that in all probability, he might in a few Months have beaten the *Turks* out of Upper *Hungary*. And then *Teckely's* party must have fallen in likewise: together with the Prince of *Transylvania*. In this way the War would in a great measure have maintain'd it self: and not have exhausted the Emperour, in that grievous manner that the Siege of *Buda* did. The Duke's numbers would also have increased, by the coming in of the *Christian Hungarians*, and Men flocking from all parts to the conquering Army. And all would have been in a flourishing condition.

These things might have come to pass, if the Duke had been pleased, (after the old Rule), to strike the Nail where it would drive: and had taken care, not to put any thing to hazard, when he had so much sure play. But nothing would content him but the Siege of *Buda*, which was too heavy for him. As if a man should be amongst Ingots of Gold; most of them portable, and some few not. and he should choose, rather to break his back at once, with one that he could not carry; than take away the lesser, at ease, one after another. after which, the greater, with a little patience, might be broken or melted down. One would think the fresh Example of the Grand *Visier's* Fool-hardiness, and the fatal Consequences of it, should have kept the Duke from committing the like Error. And 'tis a wonder how he could expect, that eighteen thousand Foot (for his Army was reckon'd at thirty thousand, and twelve thousand of them were Horse and Dragoons) could force a City, though

not very well fortified, that had fifteen thousand in Garrison. It is confess'd that the Duke had very good Men. But then it was great pity that they should be so us'd; so miserably thrown away. Had they been put upon reasonable services, they might in all likelihood have crown'd themselves with Victory and Honour, and their General with Glory.

The best Army upon Earth may be baffled by an ordinary Enemy, if it attacque him in his strength. which therefore good Generals avoid. *Cambray* was the Frontier against the *French*, and stood in their very teeth, the best part of two hundred years. But withal it was exceeding strong, and always very well mann'd and furnish'd. and therefore in all that space they never attempted it, till now lately the time they took it. When the same *French* marched against *Holland*, *Mastricht* lay just in their way. and they had threaten'd it hard. But since it had got a Garrison of ten or twelve thousand Men; they fairly past it by, as if there had been no such Town. Afterwards, when the Garrison was less by half, they fell close to it; and had it upon reasonable terms. But if they had fallen upon it at first, it might have broke their whole Army.

The *Rhetoricians* tell us, that in *Statu deliberativo* there are two principal Questions; *an utile?* *an possibile?* and to both these, there must be good answers given, to make a Design advisable. For 'tis idle to engage upon things that are easy, unless they be profitable withal; nor should any prospect of advantage tempt us to an Undertaking, if the thing be not possible, or (as the *French* and We better express it) not feasible. 'Tis confess'd that *Buda* was very convenient for the Duke. But must he therefore take it, whether he can or no? Must he therefore throw away his Army upon it, to no purpose? If a Stone Wall stand in a Mans way, must the Man run his head against it? The Advice which *Quintilian* gives his Orator, may be applied full well to a General; *Consulat vires suas*.

I do again confess, that *Buda* is a place of great importance for carrying on the War. But is there no other Place worth the looking after? Surely there are many such upon this Frontier; beside those farther in. There is upon the North side the *Danube*, *Waradine*, and *Zolnock*, and *Agria*, and *Newhausel*: and upon the South side, there is *Alba Regalis*, *Caniza*, and *Gradisca*. I will allow that *Buda* with *Pest* is more worth than any two of them. But the worst two of them is more worth than *Buda* without *Pest*: which is the present case, the Duke having *Pest* already. We can therefore only conclude, that the gaining this City is to be mainly intended and endeavour'd, in a reasonable way, and when ever there is power and opportunity.

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That which is extraordinary in *Buda* is, its situation upon the *Danube*: and that the taking it opens this River to the *Christians*, giving them free passage farther down for their Provisions and other Necessaries. *Gradisca* would do the same upon the *Save*, and *Zolnock* upon the *Teys*. but the Navigation of the *Danube* is much more considerable than either of these; it being the grand River, and coming from the chief Parts of the Emperour's Dominions. But I must take notice; That since the *Christians* had *Pest* already on the opposite bank, it seems hardly possible to hinder their passage up and down, in so great a Stream, near their own side, under the favour of dark Nights. Which makes the advantage of the Water, to be much less to this Town of *Buda* than was imagin'd. Then as for commanding the Land, the Towns before named do far excell *Buda*, as it is now without *Pest*. for it now commands but one side of the River. And surely it is plain to any that will consider; that a Town which stands upon a great River, not having a passage over it, is half block'd up. But the Towns before named command the Countries clear round. especially *Agria*, *Newhausel*, and *Caniza*: which three are the farthest advanc'd, and which are the three Horns that gore the Imperial Territories. And *Alba Regalis* and *Waradine* do also command far and wide.

But it may be said farther of *Buda*, that here is the lowest Bridge and Pass upon the *Danube*: nor is there any other in *Hungary*, *Gran* only excepted. Which place and *Barkan* do yoke this River about forty miles higher, in the same manner as *Pest* and *Buda* do here. In the old Maps of these Countries, there is the Mark and Picture of a Bridge at *Colocza*, forty miles lower. but there is no such Bridge now to be found. It appears then, that *Gran* was of the same Consideration last year, that *Buda* is now. But the Grand *Viser* (if I may look back on what I have before omitted) did not do his part in defending it. He had got an Army together after his defeat at *Vienna*, by rallying and recruiting: the *Christians* giving him leisure to do it. for they made no great haste to pursue their Victory. Part of his Army he lost foolishly, by fighting the *Christians* in their March to no purpose. who thereupon possess'd themselves of *Barkan*, on which side the Fight was. Then he let them pass the River to attack *Gran*, without Opposition. And which was worst of all, He did not put Men enow into the Town, when he might have put in what number he would. Had he fill'd *Gran*, as the *Seraskier* fill'd *Buda*, *Gran* might have been as well preserv'd. And indeed much better and easier, because of the Winter then approaching. But this is a Digression in this place: I return to the Siege of *Buda*.

2. It is taken for granted by most Men, that when the Duke of *Lorraine* had with his Cavalry defeated the *Serasquier*, he could do no less than return to *Buda*, and push on the Siege. But some are of a contrary opinion. They think, that having try'd the Strength of that Place and Garrison (which was still the same, notwithstanding the *Serasquier's* defeat) he had now a fair Occasion given him, to leave a Siege upon which he had rashly engaged. that he might pursue his Victory in a more effectual manner, and march with his whole Army after the flying Enemy. Which if he had done, in all probability he had broke them to pieces; they could never have made head against him. If they found it so hard to get an Army again together, though the Siege of *Buda* gave them so great respite and leisure; how could they have done it, if they had been closely followed? But the Duke would have been stop'd by the Bridge of *Esseck*, to which place the Enemy was fled. I answer, that this Bridge was then in a weak Condition, being not well fortified at either End. And the farther End being attacked by Count *Lesley* next year, we know how easily it was taken. Also this Bridge of *Esseck* is four or five *English* miles in length; partly over several Branches of the *Drave*, and partly over low Grounds. Admitting therefore that the Ends were not to be taken: yet the middle part could not be defended, nor the *Christians* hindered from passing over to it, without great numbers of Foot. and the *Serasquier* had scarce any Foot left: the two defeats, and the Manning of *Buda*, having taken away most of them.

Moreover it did much facilitate the Enterprize of *Esseck*, that Count *Lesley* was then in those parts with a good Body of Men. where he had taken *Virovitza*, a strong Town upon or near the *Drave*: between which Town and the Bridge of *Esseck* there was no Place of Strength. And *Lesley* commanded both sides the River: and had laid (or was about to lay) a Bridge of Boats over it, having plenty of Vessels for that purpose. And these might have been sent down the Stream to the Duke at *Esseck*, as likewise Provisions and other Neccessaries. It appears then plainly, that the Taking of this Bridge was much more feasible than *Buda*. And by the taking of it, *Buda* must fall in short time, and all that the *Turks* have in Lower *Hungary*; this being their only passage to it.

But what if the Duke had found this Bridge very strongly guarded, and the gaining it very difficult? I answer, That then he must have let it alone as well as *Buda*. There was other easy work good store, ready to his hand. and the more strongly this Place had been guarded, the more unguarded other Places must be. Also the whole Country had lain open to him. the Country on this side the *Drave*, and that between the *Drave* and the *Save*, and beyond the *Save* also. He might have gone
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which way he pleased, there being in effect no Army to oppose him. For as for the *Serasquier* and his fugitive Rabble, they would have signified nothing. And all had been full of Terror and Confusion.

Thus the Duke of *Lorrain* was fairly invited by his Victory to raise his Siege. Which also he should have done without any such Invitation. He could not but be quickly sensible, that he had taken wrong measures in attacking this City. and to persist in an Error, wise Men say is the greatest Error. Therefore very famous Commanders, when they have found themselves engaged in a bad business, have esteem'd it their wisest course to get clear of it without delay. I shall instance only in two. The great *Hannibal* of old, after he had tasted the strength of *Placentia*, made no scruple to leave it. And of later times, the great *Gustavus* thought it no dishonour to rise from before *Ingolstat*, when he found it too hot for him. Had the Duke of *Lorrain* done so here, he had been glorious: and in all probability the *Turk* had been totally ruin'd. As the Siege of *Vienna*, the year before, was the thing that preserv'd the *German* Emperour; so nothing could now preserve the *Ottoman*, but the Siege of *Buda*.

It may seem by the pains I have taken in this matter, that the design upon *Buda* is as hard to beat down, as the Walls of it are. But the difficulty is not yet quite over: for there remains a grand Objection against all that hath been said. They say, That for the Duke to have marched on into the Enemies Country, leaving *Buda* behind him with such a Garrison in it, might have been of fatal Consequence. That *Buda* must first be taken, to open the way to other places. And therefore since the attacking of *Buda* was necessary, it could not be imprudent.

To this I answer; First, that where a Frontier carries a breadth of three or four hundred miles, (and such is the Frontier between the *Turk* and the Emperour, it reaching from the northerly parts of *Transylvania* to the Gulf of *Venice*); it were very strange, if there should be but one way for a mastering Army to break in upon it; and that all should be guarded by one Town, without the taking of which nothing else could be done. I have already named seven Capital Garrisons, beside *Buda*, upon this Frontier. And there are divers lesser Places besides. Particularly there is *Novigrad* and *Hatwan*: which, after that the Duke had got *Pest* and *Vacia*, seem'd next in course; being not far off, and on the same side the River. But where there is such Choice of Places to fall upon, it is the use of skilful Generals to learn the condition of each place, and to fall upon those that are worst provided. for all Places cannot be provided alike. And surely had the Duke been minded to do the easiest things first, he might always have been doing the easiest things; or to
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Speak plainer, he might have found all things easy: whereas now by attempting the hardest thing first, he hath made all things hard. For the *Turks* do now, by the Example of *Buda*, defend their Places after another rate than they did before. But had the Duke fallen upon likely things; he would, in all probability, have found no greater resistance any where, than he found at *Gran*: which we know was very little. There was therefore no necessity for the Duke to fall upon *Buda*: since the Country was wide enough, and he might go either to the right hand or the left, as far as he could reasonably desire. By going to the Right hand, he had gone straight upon the *Drave*, which brings all sorts of Supplies out of the Hereditary Countries. down which River he had met with no *Turkish* place worth naming, till he came to *Esseck*: of whose weakness I have spoken before, and of its great Importance withal. On the other side, by going to the left hand he had gone straight upon the River *Tey*: which brings all necessaries out of the Emperour's Upper Hungary. And the Place which the *Turks* have highest upon this stream is *Zolnock*: which we know was very easily taken next year, with divers Places about it. all which Places, and many more, might have been taken as easily now. We see therefore, that which way soever the Duke had turn'd, he might have found it commodious. But

Secondly, if the Duke had turn'd no way, but had march'd straight on by *Buda*, and left that Place behind him; plainly there had been no harm nor danger in it. We find the like is frequently done by others. Not to run upon new Instances, the *French* (as hath been noted) past by *Mastricht*, and have often past by *Cambray*: and even in this War, the Grand *Visier*, when he march'd to *Vienna*, left behind him *Comorra*, and *Raab*, and *Altenburg*, and *Newstat*, beside other places. *Newstat* was near his Camp: and he might have taken it with ease. which yet he neglected to do, and no harm came of it. It must be granted, that where the invading Army is opposed by an Army almost as good, in that case it were very hazardous to engage too deep in the Enemies Country. because the Enemy by the help and favour of his Garrisons, might distress them very much, and have great advantages upon them. But if the Enemy be quite over match'd, and dare not abide within distance; (which was now the condition of the *Turks*); there is then no such danger. And Garrisons without an Army to stand by them, cannot hurt much: nor hinder the Invaders from going or staying where they please, nor from picking and choosing what work they will do. But they must take heed of undertaking any long and difficult Siege: as the Grand *Visier* did last year, though he surmounted the Incommodities of it, by the great Force he had about him. But it may be presumed, that for the most part

their work will be easy. in regard the Places that lie farther inward, cannot in likelihood be so well fortifi'd and furnish'd, as the Frontier Places are.

I confess the taking of the outmost Frontier Garrisons, is a healing Work. since thereby we clear, and set at peace, such parts of our own Country, as those Garrisons did before command and harrafs. But it must be acknowledg'd on the other side, that the Places farther inward do more annoy the Enemy, as lying within their Bowels. If it be said, that these Places, though perhaps they may be easily got, yet are hard to be kept, and hard to be relieved; I answer, that the *Christians* may keep and relieve such Places, as well as the *Turks* do *Newhausel*, *Agria*, and *Caniza*. which though it be done with some difficulty, yet this is abundantly recompensed by the great Mischief, which those Towns do to the Emperour. For which reason the *Turks* do justly set a high value upon those Towns. And surely I think it will not be denied, but that it were a very great Service, if the *Christians* could get three or four Places, as far advanced as the Towns last named. and which might gall and gore the *Ottoman* Countries, as much as the Towns last named do the *Austrian*. They that are the stronger, (which the *Christians* are now), need not be afraid to scatter the War: but should rather desire it. Since thereby they do more distract the Enemy, and put him upon a stronger Guard, and make him yet more unable to keep the Field.

These Notions are easily conceived by any considering Person: they naturally flowing from the things themselves. but I have found it a work of some difficulty, to digest and express them, and make them plain. Though perhaps to those that read, even this also may seem easy, now it is done. Moreover I am very sensible, that I have been unreasonably prolix upon this Subject. But I could not work my Matter aright, with fewer words.

3. It was a rare felicity to the Duke of *Lorrain*, and such as befalls few Generals; that when he had lost (I may not say destroy'd) one Army, he could sit still till another was brought to him. It calls to mind the Centurion in *Tacitus*, whom the Soldiers call'd *Cedo alteram*. because when he had broken one Cudgel upon them, he us'd to cry *Cedo alteram*, give me another. But the Duke of *Lorrain* if he had had an Enemy any thing near his Match, and if at this time the *Turks* had not been strangely weak, could not have had this leisure. Also he might have stay'd and call'd long enough for a new Army, if the Peace of *Flanders* (which happen'd just at this time) had not given the *Germans* liberty to march to him. And this Peace was obtain'd beyond all Expectation. It was almost

most miraculous, that the *French* should let go so great an Advantage: They that envy their Greatness, hope they will never have the like again. But to say the truth, the advantage was lost the year before. Had the *French* then fallen upon the Towns with all their Force, instead of Quarters upon the Country, (which they might have done with equal Justice, and as some conceive with less Insolence); they might have carried *Flanders* that very year, or at least put it out of condition to subsist. But now such Alliances were form'd to preserve it, and so many Mediators had concern'd themselves, that perhaps it was not safe to displease them. However it may be truly said upon the whole matter, that the *French* did not pursue their Interest in this occasion, so closely as they use to do.

Machiavell tells us of divers Men, that sadly miscarried in their Affairs by not being perfectly wicked. which he saith is frequently the ruin of great Designs. Some may apply this to the *French* Ministers: and may think that they lost their Advantage here mention'd, because they had not the Heart nor the Face to prosecute it. It seeming a little too horrid, while the *Turk* was destroying and devouring on the one side, for Them to do the like on the other. But it must be consider'd, that it was not altogether so scandalous to fall upon *Flanders*, as it had been to fall upon *Germany* it self, which was engaged in the *Turks* War. Also the *Turks*, after their defeat at *Vienna*, were not in an invading condition. and it was much more tolerable to stop the Emperour's Conquests, than to promote the *Turkish*. But moreover, the *French* Ministers are of a stronger temper, than to be hinder'd from doing those things that are convenient, either by the checks of Conscience, or by the rebukes of Shame.

What was the true Cause therefore of this strange slack Conduct at this time? If the thing be well examin'd, it will be found to proceed from the *Jesuits*: who we know have a great Ascendant over that Court. They had several times betray'd the Emperour; and now they thought fit, in requital, to betray the *French* King: and to sacrifice his Interests to theirs. It was the Interest of their Order, that the Emperour should make great Conquests. By whose Favour (he being their fast Friend) they might well hope to have many new Colledges, and some new Provinces, of *Jesuits*. which plainly would be much to the advantage of the Society. And though this might bring ruine to their great Patron of *France*, on whom the Emperour would in all likelihood turn his Victorious Forces, they did not value it. The thing they mind, is the Interest of their Order. And this seems the true Reason, why the *French* King did let slip this golden Opportunity, of making himself the Universal Monarch.

4. Of all the Mediators that labour'd in this Peace of *Flanders*, the *Dutch* did labour most: and indeed it did most concern them. The Condition of their Commonwealth at this time was full of difficulty and danger. for thus it stood. By the loss of *Flanders* they must be certainly ruin'd: the *French* were resolv'd to have a Limb of it, that is, the Town of *Luxenburg*: and the *Spaniards* were resolv'd to lose all, rather than part with any thing. But they took little Care, and made little Provision for their defence: and seem'd to cast that wholly upon the *Hollander*. as making account, that the Preservation of *Flanders* did concern *Holland* more than *Spain*. And now was the Emperour engaged against the *Turk*: *Denmark*, *Brandenburg*, and *Collen* were closely ally'd with *France*: and the rest of *Europe* seem'd cool, and willing to be quiet. This was the perplext Estate of Affairs abroad. And it was as bad with the *Dutch* at home, by reason of their intestine Divisions. The City of *Amsterdam*, and the Province of *Friesland*, did utterly refuse to engage in the War. and they gave such Reasons for it, as seem not easy to be answer'd. On the other side, the Heroick Prince of *Orange*, and the rest of the *States*, were fully determin'd to hazard all, rather than the *French* should get *Flanders*. Moreover these Divisions, in a Matter so important and in so dangerous a Conjunction, were carried on with all the Animosity imaginable: and were ready to break out into open Hostilities. So that upon the whole they were brought to very great Straits. their best Friends gave them for lost: and their Republique seem'd to be come to its fatal period. It may safely be affirm'd, that their Affairs were in a worse posture when the *French* besieged *Luxenburg*, then when (some years before) they were possess'd of *Utrecht*. But out of this grievous Labyrinth they extricated themselves to admiration. For by great Patience, Art, and Industry, they at last hammer'd out a Peace between the two Crowns; whereby the *Spaniards* were forced to sit down with the loss of *Luxenburg*, and were made incapable to lose or part with any more. The *French* being oblig'd not to take it, either by Conquest, Exchange, Gift, Cession, or by any other way or Pretence.

This Treaty may, in point of Negotiation, be accounted the Master-piece of that Republique. Wherein they shew'd as much Skill and Dexterity, as they did Constancy and Fortitude in the time of the *French* Invasion. for which they will be admir'd in all After Ages. They then sustain'd such a Shock, such a Ruffle, such a terrible Storm, as never did any People sustain and endure the like. The *Romans* put a high value upon themselves, for that when *Hannibal* lay on the one side of their City, they sent out at the other side Supplies for *Spain*. And I confess it was brave and great. But it may be consider'd, That they then with great
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Force held *Capua* besieged, which *Hannibal* had in vain attempted to relieve: that in the main they had got the better end of the Staff: and that plainly their City was in no danger. How much more firm and steady were the *Dutch*, who though they had a mighty Enemy in their Bowels, that was quite too strong for them; though most of their Country was over-run and subdu'd, and to save the rest they were fain to lay a good part of it under Water; though at the same time they had a dreadful Concussion within themselves, having with Violence chang'd their Government, not only into other Hands, but into another Form; Yet in the midst of these dismal Circumstances they carried on a War at Sea, as if nothing had ailed them, as if they had had nothing else to think on. Where they fought three Battels this very year, against the conjoyned Forces of *England* and *France*. I must crave pardon if I could not pass this by, though it be a little beside my Subject.

5. Upon the *Grand Visier's* defeat at *Vienna*, and afterward his death, two things had been proper for his Master the Great *Sultan* to do. The first was, to go to the *Hungarian War* in Person: the Occasion being so important, and all his Fortunes lying now at stake. How could he expect that others should fight for him, if he would not fight for himself? And how could he trust his Empire, and the very Being of the *Ottoman Race*, in other mens hands and to the Conduct of others; and himself ly lurking amongst his Concubines? His Presence would have given Life and Vigour to his Affairs: and raised up the Spirits of his dismay'd and drooping Subjects. Nor is there any Office so proper to a Prince, and wherein he appears so glorious, as to lead his People to Battel. The other thing was, that if he could not go himself, he would take care that he that did go (in Chief), should be invested and irradiated with the highest Authority. Or to speak plainer, That none less than the *Grand Visier* should be General in that War. So that if the *Grand Visier* was not the very fittest to be General, he that was fittest to be General was to be made *Grand Visier*. For this was not a time to advance Favourites, but to employ the best Men to most advantage. The want of the *Sultan's* presence would have been made up in good measure by the presence of so great an Officer. His Army (on which all depended) would have been better supplied, being supplied by him that commanded it. And the General Himself would have been better followed and obeyed, having the full Power of Rewards and Punishments. We know the *Romans*, in times of extreme danger, made Dictators with absolute Power. *Ferdinand* the Second had never stop'd the *Swedish Torrent* (which then was very impetuous); if he had not given absolute Power to *Wallstein*.
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his Generalissimo. It seems therefore a Mistake in the Great Sultan here, that he committed this so important Service to an Underling General : not giving him Authority suitable to the occasion. For he made one Man his *Grand Visier*, and another Man his *Serafquier*. To the one he gave the Honour and Authority, and expected the Service from the other. He appointed one Man for Preparations (which sort of People Sir *Walter Rawleigh* doth contemne), and another for Action: and this Preparation-Man was to command the Man of Action.

6. It must be avow'd, that this *Serafquier* did extraordinary things, considering the disadvantages he lay under. He not only wanted Authority requisite, that is, the whole command of the whole *Turkish* Empire ; but also he had in effect no Army. For the People he had about him did not deserve that name. They were partly such as had fled from the Rout at *Vienna*, where all the best Men had been cut off ; and partly raw undisciplin'd People. And all of them (together with that whole Empire) were under exceeding Discouragement and Consternation. So that the Duke of *Lorraine* had gain'd no great Honour, though he had totally beaten a General so ill followed, being so well followed himself. But though the *Serafquier* were in this low condition, yet he bore up for two Summers, and maintained his ground without considerable Loss : when in all likelihood he must have lost all. Which must be ascribed to his own good Conduct, as well as to the Errors of his Enemies. That which he did this year, was the relieving of *Buda* : which was a signal Service. He durst not come within danger of fighting with the *Christians*. for he could not trust his Men: finding they would not stand, and having been already twice routed. But he chiefly effected his Design by lying at a distance from his Enemies, and cutting off their Forrage and Victuals. whereby he greatly distressed and disabled them. *Gustavus Horn* advised, that the like might be done at the Siege of *Ratisbon*: but his Counsel was not followed. And some think that the Duke of *Lorraine* might have done the like at *Vienna*: and not ly at *Lintz*, a hundred miles off, as he did the most part of that Siege.

Though the *Serafquier's* Conduct in the Main were excellent, yet in some particulars it is thought he did not do well. He should not have been so forward (or so easily forced) to fight, when there was no occasion for it. And he should not have suffer'd his Enemies to lay a Bridge and pass over the *Danube*, in the face of his Army, without fighting. He seems also to have lost *Pest* too easily: while Himself and his whole Army were on the other side the River, with a free passage to it over the Bridge. Whereas he should have engaged his whole Force, together with

his own Person, in defence of that Place. For it was of very great Consequence; *Buda* being without it but like a half-fac'd Groat, if I may so express the Matter. And he could never expect to cope with his Enemy at better advantage. Nor could he hope to recover the Place, when he had thus lost it, so easily as he did soon after. There was another thing that did more offend his great Master, and for which he was in disgrace for some time: and that was, his not falling upon the *Christians* when they drew off from *Buda*. But others think, that he was not to be blamed, if, notwithstanding the ill Condition of the Enemy, he could not yet trust his Men: that he might well be content with the great Success of raising the Siege, and had now no reason to hazard all by fighting. And surely it was much wonder'd that the *Sultan* should frown upon his Preserver: when it was rather expected, that the highest Rewards and Honours should be heaped upon him.

7. Since the Duke of *Lorrain* could not obtain what he principally design'd, it concern'd him the more to keep what he had gotten: namely *Vicegrad*, *Pest*, and *Vacia*. Of these *Pest* was the most considerable, in that it held *Buda* still in fetters, and pinn'd it up to one side of the *Danube*. And the Men there in Garrison might be supplied with all Necessaries down the Stream, with almost as much ease as Quarter'd in *Austria*. And the more Men were there, the farther would they command, and the more Forrage, Victuals, and Contribution would they get. We are therefore to learn the Reasons, why this important Place was quitted; and that without Burning or Demolishing. When there could be no fear of a present Siege, the Winter being so far advanced; and when the Enemy could not easily come at them, by reason of the River between. *Pest* being thus abandon'd, one would think they should have the greater care of *Vacia*: which is also a Port Town (as I may call it) upon the *Danube*, and now the farthest advanced into the Enemies Country. But such a paltry Garrison is left in it, that after a few Weeks were past, a Party from *Buda* seizes it, almost without resistance. These After-Claps, though they made no great noise, doubled the disasters of the Campaign. For *Vacia* and *Pest* may be accounted of equal value with *Buda*: and the losing of these was as bad, as the not gaining the other.

8. The *Hungarians* of *Teckely's* party that have been in *England*, have given him a very high Character. Extolling his Courtesy, Courage, and Conduct, and likewise the Comeliness of his Person. It must be confess'd, that by the great Resistance he hath made, and the great Authority he hath maintain'd amongst his Party in a Condition so ruinous,
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he appears to be no ordinary Man. But he lost his Honour by suffering himself to be shamefully surpriz'd: whereby his Forces were shrewdly shatter'd, himself hardly escaping. The best Commander may receive a Defeat: but to suffer a Surprise is inexcusable. On the other side, this Count shewed a notable Resolution, in that after such a terrible Blow he still stood firm; and undauntedly continued his defence, against an Active and vigorous Assailant.

C H A P. IV. NEWHAUSEL. 1685.

THE Duke of Lorrain begins the Campagne once more with the Siege of Newhausel: having a brave Army of between fifty and sixty thousand good Men, and the Garrison within being now but two thousand. The Place is fiercely defended: and in one of their Sallies, the Duke is put to the Exercise of his Personal Valour, to save his Batteries from ruine. However in a Months time or thereabouts, the besieged are brought into an ill Condition. In the mean while the Serasquier, with an Army not much outnumbering that of the Christians, had invested Gran and Vicegrad. To relieve which Places, the Duke (with the Elektor of Bavaria) marches with about two Thirds of the Army: leaving the rest, under the Count Caprara, to continue his Siege. The Turks, having taken Vicegrad in three days, rise from before Gran, fight the Duke with their whole Force, and are beaten. However, they make their retreat to Buda, pass over the Bridge there, and threaten to march straight to Newhausel and relieve it, with the hazard of a second Battel. But now they hear that the Place was taken by Storm: where all were put to the Sword, save the Governor and a few Officers. Nevertheless, the Serasquier still gives out, that he is resolved to fight. But when the Christians with their whole Army were coming up to him, he repasses the Danube at the same Bridge, having first demolish'd and abandon'd Vacia and Novigrad. Being got to the other side of the River, he continues there with his Army for some Weeks: and then, for want of Forrage and Victuals, retires to Belgrade. While he staid, he sent several Messages to the Duke with Overtures of Peace: which were rejected. Upon the Serasquier's repassing the Danube, the Duke of Lorrain march'd up to the place where the Turkish Army had lain, and there Encamped for about a Month. And Forrage growing scarce, he draws back his Army, and encamps for another Month between the Rivers of Gran and Ipol: having first sent the Count Caprara with a Detachment towards Agria. While the Turkish Forces are drawn from all parts to the Serasquier, Count Lesley marches to the Bridge of Esseck and having routed the Forces that made head against him, he takes the Town of Esseck (which lies at the Bridge end) by storm: and

and burns it, with eight or nine hundred Paces of the Bridge. Which done, he returns to Virovitza. The Works of Newhausel are repaired with all diligence, and neither labour nor cost is spared: but Novigrad and Vacia are not thought worth the repairing. General Schultze doth again fall close to Teckely, is soundly repuls'd at Unguar, and then takes Esperies after a hard Siege. Whence he marches straight to Calchaw, Count Teckely's chief Town. Caprara having bombarded Agria without Success, marches to Calchaw likewise: bringing with him an Authority over all the Forces there. Whereupon Schultze lays down his Command. General Mercy and Colonel Heussler, with a Party from hence, fall into the Turkish Quarters: take Zolnock, Saravas, and several other Places; which they hold and make good against the Enemy, and are victorious in divers Encounters. The Siege of Calchaw going on, Teckely goes to the Bassa of Waradine to solicit for relief: by whom he is made Prisoner, and sent in Chains to Belgrade. Hereupon the brave Peterhafi, and all the Chief of Teckely's party, come in to Caprara. by whose Example and Perswasions Calchaw Surrenders, and all the other revolted Places, Mongatz only excepted. While these things are doing in Hungary, the Venetians are not idle on their side. After the Victory at Vienna, they had joyn'd in a League against the Turks, with the Emperour and King of Poland. And against the next Summer, they rigg'd out their Fleet, and fill'd it with Land-Soldiers, Morosini being Captain General. who took the Island of St. Maure, together with the Fortresses of Prevesa upon the Main Land of Greece. This Summer they go to Sea again, with greater Force: and make a Descent into Morea. where they take Corone, Calamata, and some other places. Also they rout the Turks more than once, and divers Christian Greeks revolt to them. As for the Poles, both the last year and this, their Forces are not great, came late into the Field, and did little.

Observations.

1. **T**HE Siege of Newhausel was carried on very substantially by the Duke of Lorrain. He first made a great semblance of besieging Novigrad, so that no body doubted of it: And then he clapp'd down suddenly before Newhausel. which though it be usual amongst the Dutch, French, and Spaniards, and other wily Gamesters; yet in these Wars of Hungary it may pass for a Stratagem. Also before he began his Attacques, he strongly intrenched himself, and finished his Lines of Circumvallation. at which he made his whole Army labour for a full week. And this being done, he push'd on his Attacques with great Constancy and Vigour. Moreover he signalized himself by his own Personal

nal Valour, when the *Turks* (in a furious Sally) were just upon the point to burn his Platformes and ruin his Batteries. In which Exigence, the Duke himself did run into the face of danger; to encourage and direct his Men, and to beat back the Enemy, continuing several hours in this terrible Service. This was a most Heroique Action. If *Alexander*, or *Cæsar*, or *Gustavus Adolphus* had been here, they could not have done more. Nor did he thus hazard his Person upon a small or slight occasion. For the Success of the Siege, and consequently of the whole Campagne, now lay at stake. Furthermore, when the Duke was called away to the relief of *Gran*, *Caprara* did well supply his place here. And he did not expose and throw away his Men by vain and multiplied Assaults; but having thoroughly batter'd the Place, fill'd the Ditches, and broke the Defences, he carried it at once. Onething hath been omitted, which is, that the Duke's Judgment must be approved, in choosing to fall upon *Nemhausel*, rather than any place else. For it sorely infested the Emperour's Quarters, and by taking it he cleared a Country as big as *Kent*. And though it was believed, that they were already distress'd for Victuals, so that there was no need of Force; yet it was good to make sure of a Place so important. Nor was their want of Victuals so great as was imagin'd: as it appeared afterward.

These are the just Commendations of this memorable Siege. But on the other side, Some think that it was slow. The Town was but indifferently mann'd; and fortified by one single Line, and a Ditch about eighteen foot broad. And yet they were more than a Month about it. Whereas it is verily believed, that a *French* Army would have had it in a Week. They took *Mastricht* in fifteen days, which was twice as strong, had thrice as many Men, and was full as well defended; with an Army no way better, or to speak more truly, not so good. Some also wonder, that *Caprara* did spare the Governor Bassa. which look'd as if he had had a mind, to encourage others to hold out with the like Obstinacy. Had this Bassa had *Caprara* thus in his power, he would have impaled him. To speak more calmly, the Bassa seem'd no fit Object of Mercy, upon two accounts. First, because he had been barbarously cruel to his *Christian* Prisoners: whom he had made work in Chains in the Mouth of the Besiegers Cannon, whereby most of them were destroy'd. Secondly, because he had stood it out beyond all Reason and the Rules of War. Which allow not Men to do all the Mischief they can, when there is no hope left, nor possibility of defence. In such a Case, the Officers ought to find less favour than others, and the Governor least of all. for that He was chiefly (if not only) in fault. The *Turks*, and especially their Commanders, should be made to fear their Enemies as much

as they do their Masters. If they yield, they are sure to dy: and they should be as sure on't, if they yield not. which is the way to deal with those People, that fight for fear of death. Some think that the Bassa's Ransom might incline Count *Caprara* to spare him. wherein I am confident they do the Count Wrong. For we must not believe, that so brave an Officer should omit a necessary and exemplary piece of Severity, out of a sordid desire of Gain. But this Bassa dyed of his Wounds not long after: and then they cut off his Head, and set it upon a Pole. Which seem'd very idle and foolish.

2. Let us now consider the *Serasquier's* Conduct: which surely appears very neat and clean. He had Orders from the *Grand Signior* to relieve *Newhausel* at any rate, and what ever the hazard were. And these Orders he must obey, whether they were wise or foolish. But he saw plainly, that to march to that place, and fight the whole *Christian* Army, had been certain destruction. they so much over-matching him in goodness of Men; and the place being so far within the Enemies Country. He therefore, by way of diversion besieges *Gran* and *Vicegrad*, which ly on the other side the *Danube*. Upon which, one of these three things must follow. Either the whole *Christian* Army must come to relieve these Places, and then *Newhausel* had been at liberty; or else they must all continue their Siege, and then both *Vicegrad* and *Gran* had been his own; or part of them must march against him, and part must stay at the Siege: and then those that staid, would carry on the Siege but weakly; and those that march'd, would be in a fair way to be beaten. The *Christians* took this last Course, and divided their Army. But they proved so strong; that they that staid, were enow to take the Town; and they that march'd, were enow to beat the *Serasquier*. However it must be confess'd, that he plaid the utmost of his Game. I know it hath been related, that he was drawn by a Wile to fight. But plainly at that time fighting was his Business: for without it *Newhausel* must be lost, and all the *Christian* Army would then be upon him. It was therefore much better, to engage part of the Enemies Force, thereby to save the Town; then sustain their whole Force, after the Town was lost. Moreover he set upon that part of the *Christians* which he was to Encounter, with all the Force that he could possibly get together. And he brought them up bravely to the Charge, and tryed to the utmost what every part of them could do. But they were beaten every where: not being able to stand against the *Germans*, who plainly hewed them down. Being thus totally routed, he nevertheless got off strangely without extraordinary loss, and made his retreat to *Buda*. There he march'd over the Bridge,

and put on a fresh countenance of fighting. Which made the Dukes of *Lorraine* and *Bavaria*, after some time, to come down upon him with the whole *Christian* Army, thoroughly prepar'd for a second Battel. And then the *Serasquier* slipt back over the River, and left his Enemies at gaze, for truly he was not in a fighting Condition. The Bridge of *Buda* stood him now in good stead: and in it he reaped the fruit of his labours. for he had been repairing it all Winter with great diligence; it having been ruin'd, when the *Christians* held *Pest*.

3. It may truly be said of the *Serasquier*, that he lost *Newhausel* gloriously. because, to preserve it, he did all that could be done. But it cannot be said, that the Duke did so by *Vicegrad*, for it was pitifully lost. This Castle stood (for it is now demolish'd) upon the *Danube*, with a Town under it: almost the mid-way between *Gran* and *Buda*. And it was the farthest Frontier on that side. If the *French* had had this Place, how would they have fortified and furnish'd it? And what a tearing Garrison would they have had in it? The *Imperialists* had time enough to do what they would to it, it being a year in their Possession. But it was so miserably unprovided, that first a Party out of *Buda* surprized (or seized) the Town, plunder'd it, and burnt it: for which the Governour was never question'd. And now a Detachment from the *Serasquier* took the Castle by Surrender in three days: in a manner within sight of the Duke and his Army. Which I confess was a very sensible disgrace. This place and *Gran* had been threaten'd for a Month before, and the Duke might have put into them what Men he pleased: they standing on the one side the River, and he commanding the other. 'Tis true, he put five hundred Men into *Gran* (when he might and should have put in five thousand.); but *Vicegrad* seem'd quite forgotten. If he could not or would not defend it, why did he not slight it? To conclude this Matter, the loss of *Newhausel* was far the greater in point of profit, and advantage, and importance; but in point of honour, the loss of *Vicegrad* was a hundred times worse.

4. To the Messages of Peace, which were sent by the *Serasquier*, the Duke return'd this Answer, That a Victorious Army was not to be amused by such Messages. But what doth he do with this Victorious Army? What Conquests, or even what Attempts doth he make? Why first he encamps upon the *Danube*, a little short of *Pest*. And that he might be sure to want Forrage in good time, it was just in place where the *Turks* had lain before. Accordingly Forrage is wanting, and he must remove. But now instead of advancing into the Enemies Country, which
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lay right before him and open to him, he Marches quite back into his own: and there makes another encamping between the Rivers of *Gran* and *Ipol*. Which two encampings having taken up two pretious Months, and the year being now well spent (though as yet no hard weather); he sends his Army into their Winter Quarters. Was ever Victorious Army so employed? Was ever Victory so pursued? If *Alexander*, or *Cesar*, or *Gustavus Adolphus* had been here, they would have pursued it after another manner. *Cesar's* Victory at *Alexia*, was one of the greatest that ever was obtain'd by Man. He had driven a brave Army of fourscore thousand Men into that Place, and held them there besieged: his own Army being much less. And two hundred and fifty thousand bold Soldiers came to relieve them. They fell upon his Trenches, (for here was the pattern of all our Circumvallations) they fell upon his Trenches on both sides, with the most obstinate Fury. But those without, were not only repulsed, but totally routed, leaving fifty thousand dead upon the place; and those within were beaten back with great loss, and forced to surrender at discretion. Of this glorious Victory *Cesar* had lost the fruit, if he had not closely followed his blow: keeping his Men upon service, for a good part of the next hard Winter.

All the World condemns *Hannibal*, for that he did not march straight to *Rome*, after the Battel of *Canna*. And we find him in *Livy* cursing and banning himself for this fatal Omission, when afterwards he left *Italy* (full fore against his Will) to rescue his own dear *Carthage*. But though *Hannibal* did not do that which was best, yet he did something; whereas here our Duke does just nothing. It was *Hannibal's* Error, that he did march to *Capua*, when he should have marched to *Rome*: But Our Duke doth march neither one way nor other, takes no work in hand, but trifles away his Time in idle encampings.

Our Illustrious Duke is justly reputed one of the Greatest Captains of this or any Age. But we have found by former Experience, that he is a little too much given to encamping, when the Season calls for Action. When he march'd with a mighty Imperial Army into his own *Lorrain*, and the *French* (under *Crequi*) were in a manner fled out of the Country; in this so inviting, so provoking an Occasion, he for several Weeks lay encamped upon the Banks of *Saar*: when all *Europe* expected his progress with impatience. I confess this might have done well, if he had come only to take the Air: but considering the Business he was upon, 'tis hard to be understood. I meddle no further with that unfortunate Campagne; which went on as it began.

To return therefore to *Hungary*; it seems very strange (for I cannot yet leave this Matter) that the Duke of *Lorrain*, having so great an advantage,

vantage, did not bear in upon the Enemy with all his power: and particularly upon the Country between the *Danube*, and the *Tibisque*, or *Tey*s. It is a very good Country, and was then fresh and untouch'd: no Army having lain upon it, or so much as march'd through it. And it was close at hand: and lay as open to him, as *Kent* doth to *Surrey*. Also there was no Enemy to oppose him. For the *Serasquier* and his heartless Rabble were on the other side the River, not daring to look towards him; and after a while were gone clean away. so that now there was no Army in *Hungary* beside the Duke's. These Invitations notwithstanding, he could not dispose his mind to move that way; though he had nothing else to do. As if he had been Enchanted; or some Spell had been laid before him, which he had not the power to pass over. I believe the like Example is no where to be found. They that favour the Glory of this High-born Prince, are troubled that he should lose the Opportunity to encrease it. If *Mercy* and *Heussler* are so renowned, for the Conquests they made with a Detachment of a Detachment; how glorious might the Duke have been by the Atchievements of his whole Army? Fifty thousand men may do a great deal of such Work, where five thousand can do nothing, because an equal Force (which is easily had) opposing them, will frustrate all their Attempts. But where five thousand can do any thing, fifty thousand will do ten times more, if there be so much to do.

How did *Hatwan* (in particular) as it were invite the Duke to besiege it, lying close by him? Where he was not likely to find greater Resistance, than *Mercy* and *Heussler* did afterward at *Zolnock*, a more considerable Place. By the taking of *Hatwan*, the Duke had been left without blame for not repairing *Vacia* or *Novigrad*. since he had now a Frontier Town, to cover the Country which the Enemy had quitted, and to press upon the Country which the Enemy still kept: which was the thing wanting in those Parts. Also the Communication of *Buda* and *Agria* had been cut off, *Hatwan* lying between them.

I am not ignorant that a wise Reason is given, why the Duke of *Lorraine*, laying aside at present the thoughts of these things, drew so soon into Winter Quarters. It is, that he might be the sooner in the Field next year. But who knows what may happen, before the next year comes? Who knows how long the Pope will live, or whether another Pope will be so liberal? Who knows how long the King of *Spain* will live? Or how long the King of *France* will continue in this Mind? Or how long this League will last between the *Germans*, *Poles*, and *Venerians*? Or how soon there may be some Accident, which may disturb the Peace of *Christendom*, and by consequence stop the progress of this War? Or whether the *Turks* will ever be again, in so bad a posture to defend them-

themselves? The Proverbial Advice, To make hay while the Sun shines, doth extend to all sorts and conditions of People. Nor should we leave any thing to be done to morrow, which may be done to day. The Duke had now a pretious Opportunity in his hands. The neglecting of one such Opportunity, may turn the Fortune of Kingdoms and Empires. Such an Opportunity ought to be embraced and made use of, as if it were never to return again, nor any like it.

The Successes of *Mercy* and *Heusler* (of which I have said something already, and must say more hereafter) do make it plainly appear; that the Duke of *Lorraine*, had it been his hap to try it, might with ease have seized most of the *Turkish* Places on that side: and gone near to have clear'd the whole Country on the North of *Danube*, quite down to *Belgrade*. But admitting he had found all the fortified Places impregnable, or at least the attacking them not advisable: yet by Marching in amongst them, and eating up the open Country (as the *French* did in *Flanders*), he had done great Service. thereby maintaining his Army at his Enemies Cost, and depriving the Enemies Armies and Garrisons of their Subsistence. If an Army be but in the Enemies Country (which yet the *Christians* in this War seem industriously to avoid, or they have strange ill luck at it), they are sure to be doing one great part of their Work, and that is, devouring.

Moreover though it should be supposed, that this also could not be done, and that no Impression of any kind could be made upon the Enemy; yet some are of opinion, that the Duke had no need to spend his time in idle Encampings, and then run into Winter Quarters before Winter: since he might have employed his Army to very good purpose. He might have laid a Bridge upon the *Danube*, somewhere near and above *Buda*, and cover'd it at each end with a strong and large Intrenchment: where a good part of his Army might have quartered all Winter. This Work had been both feasible and profitable. To make it the more feasible, the Duke had Vessels, and a Bridge ready framed, which came down the River by him when he marched last against the Enemy. Also his Army was twice as strong, as it was at the making of his last Bridge. And the *Serasquier*, who had not hinder'd That, was no way likely to hinder This. He did not so much as Quarter against him or near him: within a while he drew off yet further, and lay quite below *Buda*: and a little after he marched clear away over the Bridge of *Esseck*. The making of these Intrenchments I confess was a great Work. But there was the whole Army to do it; and such things have been frequently done by less Armies. As for the Soldiers Lodgings who were here to Quarter, they might have made *Baraques* here, as we find they have

have been forced to do at *Newbanfel*. Also they might here have had Victuals and Forrage (as before hath been noted) almost as conveniently as in *Austria* it self, by reason of the easy Conveyance down the River. and some they would have got out of the Country, commanding it far and wide. Then as to Profit and Advantage; This Bridge, with these Intrenchments, would have made large amends for the loss of *Vicegrad*, for the not repairing of *Vacia* or *Novigrad*, and the not taking of *Hatwan*. since it had been better by many degrees, than all of them put together. And this Place, with the Force within it, would have covered all that large Tract of good Land lying behind it towards *Gran*: it would have driven the *Turkish* Garrisons into corners, and harrafed all the open Country forward, almost as far as the *Drave* on the one side, and quite to the *Tey*s on the other. It might have been the *Mastricht* of *Hungary*: that is, might have done the *Christians* here as much service, as *Mastricht* did to the *French* while they held it. The *Turks* would have had a warm Winter on't, having such a Fire in their Bowels: And *Pest* and *Buda*, *Hatwan*, *Agria*, and *Alba Regalis*, and their other Garrisons hereabouts, had been sorely distressed this Winter for Victuals. We find they have much ado to subsist, though they have no Enemy near to disturb or annoy them. Moreover the *Christians*, by the help of this Bridge so fortified, would have been in a brave posture to carry on the War next Spring. These advantages the *Christians* might have had, if they would have taken some pains to procure them. But it is too truly observed of them, that in all this War they have been very sparing of their labour. Whereas the *Romans* of old, and the *French* of late, have owed their Successes as well to their hard Labour; as to their Money, their Skill, and their Valour.

Before I leave this imaginary Bridge, I must answer an Objection concerning it: which is this. It is made a chief End of having here a great Strength of Men; that they might distress and starve *Buda*, themselves being the while supplied by the *Danube*. But since *Buda* stands upon the *Danube* likewise, why might it not be as well supplied the same way? I answer, that there is a very great and wide difference: in that Provisions, &c. must come up against the Stream to the *Turks*, whereas they fall down the Stream to the *Christians*. Also the *Christian* Countries upon the River are much better cultivated, and can yield far greater Quantities of Provisions, than the *Turkish* Countries upon the same River. And we see by Experience, that the *Turks* make but little use of this kind of Conveyance, in comparison of the *Christians*. It is certainly a mighty Advantage to the *Christian* Armies in *Hungary*, that not only the *Danube*, but also the *Drave*, the *Save*, and the *Tey*s, bring them down all sorts of Necessaries, out of the Emperour's Countries.

5. The burning of the Bridge of *Esseck* was a fine Exploit performed by Count *Lesley*: who hath deservedly the reputation of one of the Emperour's best Commanders. But in the Conduct of this Affair, there are some things not easy to be apprehended. In the first place, it seems to have been carried with the least secrecy, that ever any thing was. The Gazettes gave us advice (from *Virovitza*), what Count *Lesley* and his Council of War had resolved upon. Which was, To go first to *Caniza*, and destroy the Country about it, thereby to incommode and distress that Garrison; and then to march down to *Esseck*, with design to ruine that Bridge. And a week or a fortnight after, they tell us from the same place; That according to former resolutions, Count *Lesley* had been at *Caniza* and done his work there, and was now marching to the Bridge of *Esseck*. Who can deny but that this is fair open dealing, and playing above-board? They let the World know what they intend to do, and they do it accordingly. In the next place, it is a wonder to some, that he did not keep the Town of *Esseck* when he had taken it. Though his Forces were not great, as not exceeding six thousand Men, yet there was nothing that could disturb or endanger him. For he had beaten the Enemy out of the Field; those that escaped the Rout he gave them, being fled quite to *Belgrade*. And the *Seraskier* was far off, and engaged against the Duke of *Lorrain*: and on the other side the *Drave*, over which he had no passage but by this Bridge. Moreover the making good this Town was a thing of mighty importance. For the *Turks* had been thereby deprived of their only Pass into Lower *Hungary*, and consequently made incapable to defend it or maintain a War in it. In the third place, if the Town was not tenable, or (for Reasons we are yet to learn) it was not advisable to keep it, it is still a wonder he did not do something else. There was not a Man in the Field to oppose him. And the easy taking of *Esseck*, and of *Michalowitz* in his March thither, makes it appear, how little difficulty he would have met with in other places, had he had the Heart to try them. Or he might have spent some time in fortifying and furnishing that same *Michalowitz*, which (by *De Witt's* particular Map of *Hungary*, for I find it in no other) lies commodiously upon the *Drave*, about the half way between *Virovitza* and *Esseck*. [but I doubt they have quitted this Place, because we hear no more of it.] Or at least he might have Quarter'd upon the Enemy: all that noble Country between the *Drave* and *Save* being at his Command. and if he would be moving homeward, he might have done it by slow and easy Marches, and have grazed up the Country as he went. But instead of doing any of these things, the Count marched straight away to *Virovitza* with all diligence. If a great Army of *Turks* and *Tartars* had

been at his heels, he could not have gone much faster. Being thus got back into his own Quarters, and out of danger of being burdensome to any but his Friends; he lay there very quietly and contentedly all the rest of the Summer, and did just nothing.

6. It was by special Order from *Vienna*, that *Newhausel* was re-fortified. Which makes some think that the great *Walstein* was wise: who when he accepted the Supreme Command against the *Swede*, made it in his bargain (amongst other things) that they should send him no Orders from *Vienna*. for surely these Orders about *Newhausel* seem much mistaken. The Place was in a manner totally destroyed by the Siege. the Assailants had filled up a great part of the Ditch: the Rampart was beaten down by the Cannon: and the Bombs had so torn and ruin'd the Houses, that only twelve of them were left standing. Since therefore in effect it must be all new-built, it is to be consider'd, whether the Situation did deserve that Labour and Charge. It is confess'd that *Newhausel* was a place important, when *Comorra* and It were the *Christians* Frontier on the North side the *Danube*, against *Gran* and *Lewentz* possessed by the *Turks*. *Gran* and *Comorra* standing upon the River, and *Lewentz* and *Newhausel* ten or twelve miles from it: and the *Turkish* Towns being about thirty miles distant from the *Christian*. About twenty miles more backward the *Turks* had *Novigrad* and *Vacia*, standing like the other: the first in the Upland, the last upon the River. and twenty miles yet farther back, they have *Pest*, *Hatwan*, and *Agria*, all abreast: their Land on this side the *Danube* growing now broader. This was the posture till about forty years ago; and then the *Turks* took *Newhausel*. Whereupon the *Christians*, to curb this Garrison, new-built *Leopoldstat*, upon the River *Waag*; and they strongly fortified *Nitria*, upon the same River on which *Newhausel* stands. Also now lately, and after the Victory of *Vienna*, the *Christians* took *Gran* and *Lewentz*: and (to come to the present time) this year they took *Newhausel*. Here it must plainly appear to any considering Person, that by the *Christians* having *Lewentz* and *Gran*, *Newhausel* was become useless. And it became more useless by the *Turks* abandoning *Novigrad* and *Vacia*, which happened soon after. And it had become more useless yet, if the *Christians* had fortified *Novigrad* or *Vacia*, and had carried on the Frontier so far. [To say nothing of the Bridge upon the *Danube*, which I so much fancied in the lines fore-going.] A strong Garrison there, had covered all the Country behind it, and commanded a great way forward. But *Newhausel* is now deep within the *Christian* Quarters, being almost seventy miles from any *Turkish* Garrison. It doth not cover one
foot

foot of the *Christian* Country, nor command one foot of the Enemies. Was it not therefore a strange Resolution, to bestow nothing upon Places that had been highly useful; and to labour so much, upon a Place that is wholly useless? There was more need to slight two or three Garrisons about *Newhausel*, than to make more. As things are now, there is not such a Cluster of Garrisons upon the face of the Earth. Here stands *Newhausel*: and behind it *Leopoldstat* within fifteen miles: on the left hand *Nitria* in the same distance: on the right hand *Comorra* within ten miles, and *Raab* within ten miles more. Then before it (toward the *Turks*) are *Gran* and *Lewentz* within thirty miles. And these two last, which are nearest the Enemy, are almost forty miles from any Garrison they have. So that this multiplying of Garrisons, in this place, serves to small purpose.

The condition of Affairs is now such, that the *Turks* are not likely ever to come so far as *Newhausel*. And what if the Scene should be alter'd? and the *Turks* should advance with a mighty Force this way? Were it better in this case, that *Newhausel* lay rased to the Ground, or were fortified as now it is, and had a Garrison (as now it hath) of four thousand Men? It seems very plain that it were better rased to the Ground. For the Town might be well spared, there being more than enow hereabout besides; and the Men might be made better use of, either in the Field, or for the reinforcement of the Neighbouring Garrisons. A convenient number of Garrisons, well fortified and well mann'd, is certainly the best. Where they are too many, they cannot all be well mann'd: whereby some or other will become an easy Prey to the Enemy. But they may prove hard to be recover'd; and the Enemies nestling and fixing in them may prove the destruction of the whole Country. So that too great a number is not only impertinent, but also dangerous and pernicious. If therefore a hundred strong Holds could be had with a Wish in the *Christian Hungary*, more than now are, there being (we may presume) enow already; the next Wish should be to have them all demolish'd.

That the Mistake in fortifying *Newhausel* may more plainly appear, I will make an Instance (by Supposition) in our own Country. Suppose *England* and *Scotland* were under two distinct Kings, as they are now happily united under One. The *Scots* take *Barwick*, and then they take *Newcastle*, with all the Places between. And at last they take *Durham* also. to curb which last, as being the farthest advanced, the *English* make several strong Garrisons near it. Afterwards the *English* retake *Newcastle*; and all the other Places, *Durham* and *Barwick* excepted. At another time they likewise retake *Durham*: but having first ruin'd

it with their Bombs and Cannon. And hereupon the *Scots* demolish *Barwick*, and abandon it. Would not the World think us to be perfectly mad, if we should now resortify *Durham* with might and main, when it signifies nothing; and should wholly neglect *Barwick*? It is the very same case here. The *Danube* is their Sea: *Vacia* answers *Barwick*: *Gran* is *Newcastle*; and *Newhausel* is *Durham*.

7. We must believe General *Schultz* to be a Person of great Courage and Activity. One sign of it is this; that he was always in the Field, and at work, some Weeks before other Men. Nevertheless he made no great progress: having to do with a tough Enemy, that held him hard to it. The Places that he besieged, were defended with the utmost Obstinacy: Nor did Count *Teckely* fail on his part, to use unwearied diligence in relieving them. At last by the taking of *Esperies*, and the investing of *Caschaw* it self, *Schultz* seemed to have brought his Affairs into a very hopeful posture. But now another is set over his head: and takes his work out of his hands. We cannot blame him for laying down his Command upon it.

8. Count *Caprara* is the Man that now Commands at *Caschaw*. He was first sent to *Agria* by the Duke of *Lorrain*, upon an unusual Errand: which was, To take it (if he could) with Bombs. And this design was publish'd to the World, some time before it was put in Execution: for all the *Gazettes* had it. I think an Example will hardly be found, of a Town this way taken. Of a small Castle perhaps there may. The *French*, 'tis true, have attack'd some Towns in this manner: as *Oudenard* by Land, and *Genoa* by Sea. But this was not with any hope or expectation to take the Places. The design therefore upon *Agria* was not like to succeed, and it succeeded not.

9. But *Agria* was only a thing by the by. and though it be one of the chief Fortresses of the *Turkish* Empire, yet it was to be taken by a party, in their passage. We must therefore know, That this Force under *Caprara* was by the Duke of *Lorrain* sent chiefly against Count *Teckely*. But how comes the Duke of *Lorrain* to concern himself thus with *Teckely*, who had *Schultz* upon him already? we thought the Duke had been engaged against the *Serassquier*: and that the *Serassquier* (with the *Ottoman* Forces) was his Antagonist; with whom he was to cope, and to try Masteries. And we expected, that since the Duke had already worsted him, he would never leave him off till either he had beaten him to pieces, or chas'd him out of *Hungary*. But the Duke of *Lorrain*, it seems,

seems, entertain'd no such Thoughts: and all that little that he did was against *Teckely*. As if a Mastiff, having a Bear by the Throat, should let go his hold to snap at a Cur.

10. Though *Caprara* fail'd at *Agria*, yet at *Caschaw* he had great Success: having that strong Fortrefs yielded to him in a short time. But for this he was beholden to *Teckely's* ill Usage by the *Turks*. Which was a strange Hit to *Caprara*; and made those things smooth and easy to him, which might otherwise have been exceeding difficult. For surely at the Surrender of *Caschaw*, they were found so well provided at all points; that had it not been for *Teckely's* Imprisonment, *Caprara* might have been as well repuls'd, as ever Man was.

11. When *Caprara* had made such quick work at *Caschaw*, it was expected, that he would immediately have marched after *Mercy* and *Heussler*, (who were now in the course of their Victories); or at least have sent them a good Reinforcement. Since the Nail did drive here so well, 'twas pity there should want hands to strike it. These brave Commanders wanted nothing but greater Forces, to make greater Conquests: those they had with them, being hardly sufficient to Man the Places they took. It had therefore been well done by *Caprara*, if he had sent a good supply after them. But if he had gone himself, he had gain'd the Glory of the whole Action: as well of the things that had been done before his coming, as of those that should be done after. all would have been ascribed to the General *Caprara*. But he seem'd little to mind these Matters. All that he now did, was to ly hatching over his new Conquest of *Caschaw*, and to put his Men in Winter Quarters. And this last he did sooner then he needed, the Season being yet favourable. For we find that *Mercy* and *Heussler* continued in Action, and in the Field, for several Weeks after *Caschaw* was surrender'd.

12. It hath been said before, that the Surrender of *Caschaw* and other Places was occasion'd by *Teckely's* Imprisonment. And surely the Imprisonment of Count *Teckely* by the *Turks*, was a most horrid Act even amongst *Infidels*. He fell by the Fraud of faithless Barbarians, to whom himself had been too faithful. But the *Turks* were sufficiently punish'd for it: since it caus'd the Submission of the revolted *Hungarians* to the Emperour, which to the *Turks* was one of the greatest Blows they have receiv'd in all this War.

13. Among all the Champions engaged in this War of *Hungary*, *Mercy* and *Heussler* have born away the prize. It must be confess'd they
went

went about their Business like Workmen. These are they that with a handful of Men, and when the year was almost quite spent: fell into the Enemies Country, and made very considerable Conquests. Which they have bravely maintain'd ever since: upon all Occasions (and many such Occasions happen'd) beating and chasing the Enemy. *Heusler* had made himself famous before the Campaign began: and had given great proofs of his diligence and courage in hindering the Relief of *Newhausen*. for the effecting of which important Service the *Turks* made continual Attempts. He was almost all the Winter on Horseback: while others were in their Stoves, at *Vienna* and *Innsbruck*. And now, as *Caprara* had been detached from *Lorraine*, so *Mercy* and *Heusler* were detached from *Caprara*. and with their Party (for it may not be called an Army) they put themselves upon Action, when the great ones were got into their Winter Quarters. They took *Zolnock* first, and afterward they took *Saravus*: both which are considerable Passes. the last upon the great River of *Keroz*, and the first upon the greater River of *Teys*. And the potent City of *Debreczen*, which before was neutral, they made to be wholly Imperial. They also took several other Places of less name, cleared a large Country, and pierced deep into the Enemies Quarters. They shewed what the Duke of *Lorraine* might have done, if he had pleased with his whole Army to March that way. He might as easily have taken *Waradine*, and *Segedine*, and *Temeswar*, as they took *Saravus* and *Zolnock*. He might have master'd the whole Country on this side the *Danube*, as easily as They did part. And as They Quarter'd their party upon the Enemy all Winter, so He might have done by his Army: not needing to send them so far as he did, some of them to the remotest parts of *Germany*. To make the thing shorter; if the Duke of *Lorraine*, after the Battel of *Gran*, had deliver'd his victorious Troops to *Mercy* and *Heusler*; we may well imagine what work they had made, and how like a Torrent they had born down all before them.

14. When the *Venetians* broke with the *Turk*, and joyn'd in the War against him; a Judgment might easily be from thence made, that he was in a very ill Condition. For we might well think, that this wary People (who also have perfect Intelligence of the State of that Empire) would not engage but upon sure terms. I believe this is the first time that they have been guilty of taking voluntary Arms against the *Turk*. they not being much given to that sort of fooling, which some call Gallantry. This is not spoken in derogation of the *Serene Republique*. They deserve great Honour upon several accounts. Nor ought we to heed the Character given them by *Joseph Scaliger*, in his Invektive Poem. Which I think

think is the bitterest *Satyr* that ever was written, next to that of *Catullus* against *Cæsar*. It seems the Pretensions of this Family to *Verona*, had fill'd the Mans Pen with Gall and Vinegar.

The *Venetians* having thus undertaken the War, let us see how they prosecute it. Their *Terra firma*, or Land upon the Continent, lies round the bottom of their Gulf: within which, upon certain small Islands, *Venice* it self is situate. Most of the Land by much, doth ly on the Western side: and takes up a good part of *Lombardy*. The Eastern Extremity joyns upon *Dalmatia*: some of which Country they also have, the *Turks* possessing the greatest part. and this is the only place, where they border upon the *Turks* by land. Hither their Armies may march by land; or be transported cross the Gulf, by a short Cut and at an easy Charge. and here they might also be supplied at pleasure. Moreover the Country of *Dalmatia* lies extended upon this Gulf of *Venice*, from *Istria* to *Albania*, between three and four hundred miles in length: and it would be to the *Venetians* a thing of mighty importance to be sole Masters of it. It lies just at their doors: It would make their Dominion almost as weighty on this side of the Gulf as on the other: and it would establish and secure their Sovereignty over that Sea, something better then their yearly marrying their *Doge* to it. Of all the places in the World it lies most convenient for them. one foot of ground in *Dalmatia* is worth two or three elsewhere. And since the Enemy had likewise the *Germans* and *Poles* upon him, against whom his utmost Endeavours were required, and probably would be all too little; it could not otherwise be. but that *Dalmatia* would be very slenderly guarded. And it proved so in the Event: the *Turks* Forces there being inconsiderable.

It was therefore with reason expected, that the *Venetians* would make it their principal Care, to get a good Army in *Dalmatia*. Which if they had done, it was hardly possible for them to fail of Success. So that in all humane probability they might have made an easy Conquest of that whole Country. And then, their Forces being increased by the accession of the *Christians* there, and maintain'd in great measure by the Country they had conquer'd; they might have carried the War into *Albania*, or *Servia*, or *Bosnia*: which border upon it, and would have been found as much unprovided. But in stead of this, they fall with might and main to Rigging out their Fleet, for which there was no occasion: and they fill it with their Land Forces. As much neglecting *Dalmatia* out of Choice, as the *Turks* did out of Necessity. The *Turks* could not have a Force there, and it seems the *Venetians* would not. And the second Campaign was worse then the first. For in the first they had there an Army, though it were small and inconsiderable: but in the second, they had none at all, And

And what did they do with their Fleet, in which we see was all their Confidence, and which took up all their Care? The first Summer was almost all spent in Preparations. At last they got to Sea: and took a small Island, with a Fort near it upon the Main. And this was all they did that year: which did no way answer the Charge. The next year, as their Force was greater, so also they got out sooner. And they carried their Army to the farther part of *Morea*, above a thousand Miles from *Venice*. It cannot be denied, but that they did their Work here very substantially and Soldier like. And they had as much Success as could be expected from such an Army. Which also was a good Army, considering how far they were carried on Shipboard, and how great the Charge was of the Fleet that attended them. But here lies the Wonder, that they should send an Army so far, when with the same Expence they might have had one in *Dalmatia* three or four times as big, as it is well known to those, that know the Charge of a Fleet. What could they promise to themselves in *Morea*, more than in *Dalmatia*? Did they hope to find them unprovided there, and a small Force there to oppose them? they could not be worse provided then in *Dalmatia*, where there was no Force at all. Also the Places in *Morea* were as well fortified as in *Dalmatia*: and the *Christians* were as likely to come in to the Conquerors, and revolt from the *Turks*, in the one Country as in the other. The Matter therefore in short stands thus demonstrable. Forty or fifty thousand Men in *Dalmatia* could do much more then twelve or fifteen thousand in *Morea*: But forty or fifty thousand might as easily be had in *Dalmatia*, as twelve or fifteen thousand in *Morea*: Therefore it had plainly been more advisable, to fall upon *Dalmatia* then *Morea*.

For a further Illustration, let me make another Instance at home, and suppose once more that we had War with *Scotland*. In a time also when they were under great discouragement and disorder, had other Enemies upon them, and were very weakly provided to defend themselves. And We were willing to make the best use of such an Opportunity. Would it not now be a rare Contrivance, if in stead of pouring a main Army into the South Parts of that Kingdom, which border upon us and ly open to us, we should send a great Fleet with a small Army, round by Sea to the farthest North? There to ly Hawking after Ports, when we might the while have been Conquering whole Countries. The Cases are exactly parallel: only with this difference, that whereas We should have gone two or three hundred miles out of Our way, the *Venetians* have gone a thousand out of Theirs. I might also instance in the *French*: and shew how contrary their Sentiments are to the *Venetians* in this matter. When They are minded to invade the *Spanish* Kingdoms, they never dream

dream of carrying Armies by Sea, to *Cales*, or *Gibraltere*, or other places remote; but fall directly into *Catalonia* or *Biscay*. The *Dutch*, 'tis true, in the great War of the Confederates against the *French*; though they had work enough in *Flanders*, yet they sent a Fleet with some Land-Men in it, to the farther parts of *France*. But they did this but once: they never thought fit to repeat it. Well perceiving, that the Money which such a Fleet must cost, would be much better bestowed upon increasing their Army in *Flanders*. Beside, they did not design to make any great Conquests, or carry on a War at Land, as the *Venetians* do: but meerly to alarm and infest the Sea Coasts. I cannot but observe by the by; that the *Dutch* did manage this Affair, in the Execution of it, as weakly, and awkwardly, and unskilfully, and unlearnedly, as ever did Men. I know this may seem incredible: but I could make it plainly and particularly to appear, if it were not too long a digression.

It must be confess'd, that a Fleet and Army have notable Advantages by the Swiftness of their Motion: especially where a large Sea-Coast lies expos'd to them. For it is impossible to hinder their Landing, as *Rawleigh* doth well demonstrate. And before their Opposers can come up, they will for some time be Masters of the Field: so as to be able to ravage the open Country, and likewise to possess themselves of some Ports. which being relievable by Sea, will not easily be recover'd. By this way, he that is Master at Sea may put great hardships upon an Enemy, that at Land is much stronger then himself. And wise Men are of opinion, that the *English* might shrewdly trouble *France* this way, if a War should happen. But the *Venetians* were now above these things: and had a better Game to play. A Country of the Enemies lay open to them, at their doors, and but weakly guarded, and joyning to them by Land. I think there cannot be stronger Invitations. What greater Advantage can be desired, then to have a good Army in the Enemies Country, clearly Master of the Field? And this they might certainly have had, if they had employed their main Force upon *Dalmatia*. To be Master of the Field, though but for a time, is the End and Aim even of a desultory Sea-War: as it hath been already noted. And surely if the temporary advantage be so desirable, to have it constant and permanent must be so much more. The *Venetians* moreover had not now a stronger Enemy to deal with. considering the Circumstances he lay under, he was much weaker then themselves. And therefore they had no need to run a Wild-goose Chase, when they might carry their Business sure before them, the plain way.

It must also be confess'd, that it was necessary the *Venetians* should have a Fleet at Sea. But a much less had been sufficient. We find that

the Fleet or Squadron, which *Molino* commanded in the *Archipelago*, was more then the *Turks* could deal with.

But here it will be objected, That the *Venetians* could not bring this great Army into *Dalmatia*, for want of Men to do it with. To this I answer; That the Money they spent in equipping and maintaining their great Fleets, would have drawn Men to them from all parts of *Europe*. And the fame of so hopeful and glorious an Expedition, would have roused up the most effeminate even of their own Subjects.

It may be objected also, That regard must be had to the general Interest of the Confederates. And this is best served by giving the greatest diversion to the *Turks*. And the diversion is greater by attacking *Morea*, which is far from *Hungary* the chief Scene of Action; then by attacking *Dalmatia*, which is near it.

To this I answer; First, that the greatest Force makes the greatest Diversion: and therefore since there might be a much greater Force in *Dalmatia* then in *Morea*, the Diversion would be much greater in *Dalmatia*. Or according to what I said before, forty or fifty thousand Men in *Dalmatia*, would give the *Turks* a greater Diversion, then twelve or fifteen thousand in *Morea*. Secondly, As I have said upon another occasion, that Diversion is as good as Conjunction; so I say here and now, that Conjunction is as good as Diversion: and therefore it cannot be hurtful, that the *Christian* Armies be near one another. It is the common Interest of Confederates, that they all fall on where they can act with the greatest Strength and Vigour. but whether near one another, or a great way off, is no way material. Thirdly, It is confess'd, that *Dalmatia* being near to *Hungary*, if those were the places chiefly attacked, the *Turkish* Armies that defended them might relieve and assist each other, as there was occasion. And would not the *Christian* Armies, that act in those parts, have the same Convenience? Fourthly, It is confess'd likewise, that the *Turks* that defend *Morea* are quite divided from the rest. but so also are the *Christians* that attack it. If therefore we distract the Enemies Force, by distracting our own, where lies the advantage? Fifthly, Herein the *Turks* had the advantage, that their Forces were found ready in *Morea*; which must have marched as far as *Dalmatia*, if that had been vigorously invaded. And so they were saved the labour of some Months, which that long March had required. Sixthly, If the best way of Diversion be to go far off, then the farther the better. And therefore the *Venetians* should have sent their Fleet and Army, another thousand Miles farther. which they might have done. *Egypt* or the *Holy Land* lay very fitly for their purpose: and this had been a rare Diversion.

sion. But if we will speak seriously, no man can think that such a Project had been advisable.

Thus we see that the common Interest did not oblige the *Venetians* to go so far as *Morea*. And as for their own Interest, it plainly led them to *Dalmatia*, as the most commodious, which thing hath been noted before: It may now be added, that if they could get *Dalmatia*, they might keep it: but except the *Turk* be beaten out of *Europe*, he will find Opportunities to beat the *Venetians* out of *Morea*. And in the mean time, let them do what they can, it will be a Charge and a Burden to them, whereas *Dalmatia* would maintain and defend it self. 'Tis granted, that the Conquest of *Morea* would finely enlarge their Sea-Dominion: but there is nothing like securing their Gulf, which is done by the Conquest of *Dalmatia*.

Admitting therefore that the attacquing of *Morea* were better for the *Austrians* and *Poles*, and would more facilitate their Conquests: yet clearly the *Venetians* are to do what is best for themselves. They are not bound to be beating the Bush, while others catch the Hare: nor to hold the Man's hands, while others rifle him: nor to be making Diversions, while others are making Conquests.

They must not think that those others, who have chosen the better part, will allow them any share in Their Acquisitions: nor must they reckon that they shall gain any more by the War, then what Theyselfes get possess'd of.

The *Venetians*, it is believed, have advanced more Money towards this War, since the time they engaged in it, then the Emperour hath done. And they might have had as good Armies at least, and have been in a fair probability to make as great Conquests; had they not gone the wrong way to work, and begun at the wrong end. You will say the Emperour was vastly help'd by the *Popes* Money. But the *Venetians* might have had an equal share with him, if they had made their bargain wisely.

They that would excuse the *Venetians* Conduct, are still of opinion, that they were obliged to it by Agreement with their Confederates. But we do not know this: nor is it to be presumed. It being much more usual, that Confederates in these cases be left at liberty, each to make the best of his own Game. But if there were such an Agreement, it was their great Error to consent to it.

It hath been observed of the House of *Austria*, that they have a particular faculty of putting hard Conditions upon their Allies. But the *Venetians* were not now to be imposed upon. For they came voluntarily into a War, in which the others were engaged before: and therefore

might have had what terms they pleased. So that it was their own great fault if they were not good ones.

It is the opinion of some Men; that the wise State of *Venice*, in this Affair, were over swayed by natural Inclination: which it is very hard to withstand. They are much better provided for a War at Sea than at Land. which might make them apt to turn their Forces that way. We see all Creatures, by a certain Instinct, love to make use of that Part, which Nature hath most strongly arm'd them withall. And the *Venetians* did now as naturally make use of their Fleet, as Bores use their Tusks, or Bulls use their Horns, or Horses their Heels.

I cannot leave the *Venetians* without one Remark more. It was much wonder'd, That when they had been victorious in *Morea*, and remain'd Masters of the Field, they yet carried their Army thence, to their own Neighbouring Islands for Winter Quarters. As if they had thought it a breach of good Manners, to quarter upon an Enemies Country. Or as if they had made *Hungary* their pattern: where all were highly Civil in this kind, two rude Fellows (*Mercy* and *Heussler*) excepted. But what could the *Venetians* get by so doing? Certainly the Victuals which the Army consumed in their Quarters, would have done as well if it had been brought to them at *Morea*. And why should not the Victuals be carried to the Men, as well as the Men to the Victuals? Moreover had the Army staid here, if they could not have maintain'd themselves wholly, they must have got something towards their Maintenance. And the Winter in *Morea* is mild and gentle: it being the most Southern part of all the Continent of *Europe*. Also by their stay they had better protected the poor revolted *Greeks*: who contrariwise were in a very hard Condition, when they were abandon'd by their new Friends, and left to the rage of their old Masters. And this, as the case here stands, is one great Evil of a desultory Sea-War. The *Greeks* are ruin'd by the *Christians*, if they come not in to them; and by the *Turks*, if they do. Such a War being fit to infect and destroy, but not to protect.

This sending Men so far to Winter Quarters, seems to be a new fashion. And so doth the proclaiming beforehand the time and place of Rendezvous. *Cæsar* was nine years in conquering *Gaul*: but we cannot find that ever he did either of these things. If he had drawn back his Army every Winter, to Quarter in *Italy*; he might have been nineteen years about this Work, and left it undone at last. But his way was, to Quarter them in the midst of their Business, and either upon his Enemies, or as near them as he could, in several Camps which they strongly intrenched. And when Spring came, he did not use to make a formal

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mal appointment of a Rendezvous; but by close Orders, and without noise, he drew his Men together; and fell in among the Enemies, where he was least expected, as sudden as a Clap of Thunder. Commonly the first notice they had of him, was by seeing their Country in flames.

The Prince of *Orange* hath, of late years, given us a Pattern of a Rendezvous. and it was at the Siege of *Ben*. To which Place he made his Army march, from several Quarters and by several ways: none of them knowing or guessing, whither they were going or what they were to do, till they all met at one and the same time (their Marches being so admeasur'd) under the Walls of the Town. We heard they had invested the Place, before we heard that they were marching towards it; and we heard they had taken it, almost as soon as we heard that they were before it. This important Success may justly be accounted the first step of *Holland's* deliverance from the *French*.

To shew the advantage yet further, of keeping an Army close up upon the Enemy all Winter, if it may possibly be done; I shall here bring a domestique Example. though the memory of it I confess is not pleasing. Our rebellious *Rampers* got their Victory at *Dunbar* in September: after which they took in *Edeburg*, *Lieth*, and some other places; with the Countries on this side *Sterling*. and then the Winter came on. They now well saw, that these new Conquests would not be able to give Winter Quarters to their Army. But did they therefore draw them back into *England*? No, not a Man of them: they kept them all in *Scotland*. And moreover they were sending them Recruits all Winter: with the addition of divers new Regiments. Then for their Subsistence; they sent them by Sea, both Victuals for their Men, and Hay for their Horses. So that against Spring, their Army was more then doubled, upon the place, and ready for Action. Here now were Fellows that prosecuted their Business to the utmost. And surely without this vigorous Persistence, they had not brought that Kingdom so soon under their Yoke; nor forced the King to that most Glorious, (but withal most hazardous, and only not fatal) March into *England*. To apply this Example, I do affirm; That the *Christian* Armies might as easily have been kept all Winter in *Hungary* or *Morea*, as the Blaspheming Army (so the *Scots* elegantly call'd it) was in *Scotland*.

15. The *Magnanimous* King of *Poland* is not to be blamed for the slack Proceedings of that Kingdom. but all the fault must be laid upon their unhappy Constitution: which seems to be meerly a tryal of Skill; how far Monarchy and Republic being mixed together, may enervate and confound each other. And it is from the wretched defects

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in their Government, that so mighty a Country makes so small a figure in the World. This King, after the Relief of *Vienna* and the defeat of the Grand *Vizier*, (in which glorious Service he had a principal hand); and after the taking of *Gran* and some other Places; retired into his own Kingdom. the Quarters assign'd him in Upper *Hungary* being made too uneasy by *Teckely's* Garrisons. Now the *Poles* consult how to prosecute the War. And since they joyn upon the *Turk* themselves, they resolve to employ their Forces upon their own Frontier. Which surely was well consider'd. for now they might work for themselves: whereas in *Hungary* they must work for another. And as to the Common Interest and Service, Diverfion and Conjunction are equipollent. or to speak more at length, It doth as much good to divert the Enemy, as to joyn with the Friend.

The *Turks* border upon the *Poles* in *Moldavia*: which is a *Christian* Country, but tributary to the *Turks*, and at their Command. being also Govern'd by a *Vaivod* or *Hospodar*, appointed by the Great *Sultan*. It was formerly dependent upon *Poland*: and it is divided from it by the River *Niefter*. Into this fertile Country the *Poles* resolve to March, where they could meet with little opposition; almost all the *Turkish* Forces being drawn into *Hungary*. And we may be sure the *Christian* Inhabitants were not unwilling to be freed from their Servitude: especially if fair terms were offer'd them. But the *Polish* Levies and Recruits went on so exceeding slowly, that it was toward the end of September, before they got into the Field. And then they were about a Month in laying a Bridge over the *Niefter*. So that by that time they were got into *Moldavia*, it was towards the end of October. And after they had been there some five or six days, without doing or attempting any thing; they found the Winter come on so fast, that they concluded it their best way to March back into their Winter Quarters. And they did March back to their Winter Quarters accordingly. Was not this a most famous Expedition? We may defy all Places and Ages to shew the like. The next year they got sooner into the Field, though not with so good an Army. But the *Turks*, having now recover'd their Spirits, brought such a Force against them, and beset them so close, that they had much ado to make their Retreat.

By what hath been here related and observ'd, it plainly appears; That the *Christians* have lost the greatest Opportunity, that ever they had against the *Turks*. These last, by the destruction of their Army at *Vienna*, were brought to such a condition; that they were no way
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able to resist the united Powers of the *Germans*, *Poles*, and *Venetians*. Whose Force also was much increased by the great Sums of Money advanced by the Pope. And the whole *Turkish* Empire was in a strange Consternation and Confusion. But in this so favourable a Conjunction; the *Germans* engaged themselves before *Buda*, against Sense and Reason, where they were held in Shackles: the *Poles* were asleep, when they should have been most active: and the *Venetians* spent their time and their Money, in rigging out a Fleet to no purpose, and then in playing at small Game. Had the *Christians* on all sides, and with their whole Power, press'd briskly and vigorously upon the Enemy; it is probably believed, That the Duke of *Lorrain* might (the very first year) have beaten them out of *Hungary*; the *Venetians* might have conquered *Dalmatia*, and the adjoining Countries: and the King of *Poland* might have seized *Moldavia*, together with *Valachia* which stood upon the same terms, and Marched to *Constantinople*.

F I N I S .
